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RHETORIC AND REALITY IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW 
Stewart E. Sterk* 
Why give authors an exclusive right to their writings? Copyright 
rhetoric generally offers two answers. The first is instrumental: 
copyright provides an incentive for authors to create and dissemi-
nate works of social value.1 By giving authors a monopoly over 
their works, copyright corrects for the underincentive to create that 
might result if free riders were permitted to share in the value cre-
ated by an author's efforts. The second answer is desert: copyright 
rewards authors, who simply deserve recompense for their contribu-
tions whether or not recompense would induce them to engage in 
creative activity.2 
The rhetoric evokes sympathetic images of the author at work. 
The instrumental justification for copyright paints a picture of an 
author struggling to avoid abandoning his calling in order to feed 
his family. By contrast, the desert justification conjures up a genius 
irrevocably committed to his work, resigned - or oblivious - to 
living conditions not commensurate with his social contributions. 
The two images have a common thread: extending the scope of 
copyright protection relieves the author's plight. 
Indeed, the same rhetoric· - emphasizing both incentives and 
desert - consistently has been invoked to justify two centuries of 
copyright expansion.3 Unfortunately, however, the rhetoric cap-
tures only a small slice of contemporary copyright reality. 
Although some copyright protection indeed may be necessary to 
induce creative activity, copyright doctrine now extends well be-
yond the contours of the instrumental justification. The 1976 stat-
* Mack Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. A.B. 1973, J.D. 1976, 
Columbia University. - Ed. The author would like to thank Marci Hamilton, Bill Patry, 
and Jeanne Schroeder for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts. 
1. The Supreme Court often has invoked an incentive justification for copyright. See, e.g., 
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (noting that copyright "in-
tended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special 
reward"); see also infra section II.A.1. 
2. The Supreme Court also has offered this desert justification for copyright. See, e.g., 
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities 
deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered."). 
3. See infra Part I. 
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ute4 and more recent amendmentss protect authors even when no 
plausible argument can be made that protection will enhance the 
incentive for authors to create. The notion that according copyright 
protection to architectural works will generate more creative archi-
tecture, for instance, is manifestly ridiculous.6 Even in situations 
where instrumental justifications remain plausible, their foundation 
is often shaky. The desert justification for copyright fares little bet-
ter. The beneficiaries of expanded copyright doctrine often are not 
struggling authors but faceless corporate assignees well-versed in 
the ways of the business world. Moreover, even when authors 
would benefit from expanded protection, it is far from clear why 
they deserve financial remuneration commensurate with their tal-
ents. Indeed, the underexplored premise that authors "deserve" 
the rewards copyright gives them requires some heroic 
assumptions. 
My first objective in this article is to explore the gulf between 
copyright rhetoric and copyright reality. After examining copyright 
rhetoric, the article demonstrates how neither the need to generate 
creative activity nor the desire to reward deserving authors pro-
vides a plausible justification for current copyright doctrine. 
Why, then, does copyright doctrine continue to expand? The 
concluding section suggests some answers. Interest-group politics 
provides an obvious answer and one well-substantiated by the his-
tory of copyright legislation. But the story does not end with 
interest-group politics. Instead, I suggest that the nation's elite, in-
cluding its lawmakers, has a stake in believing and acting on copy-
right rhetoric. The elite's investment in the status quo reinforces 
the power of the interest groups who have fueled copyright 
expansion. 
I. COPYRIGHT RHETORIC 
Since the Statute of Anne,7 copyright rhetoric has focused both 
on economics and on "deserving" authors. The statute's preamble 
deplored the growing tendency of printers and booksellers to re-
print books "without the Consent of the Authors or Proprietors ... 
4. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1994)). 
5. See e.g., Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified 
as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A (1994)); Architectural Works Copyright Protection 
Act, Pub L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-02, 
120 (1994)). 
6. See infra section II.C.3. 
7. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (Eng.). 
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to their very great Detriment, and too often to the Ruin of them 
and their Families."8 According to the preamble, not only were 
these printers and booksellers usurping revenues from more deserv-
ing authors, but copyright legislation also was needed "for the En-
couragement of Learned Men to Compose and write useful 
Books."9 Indeed, the statute was entitled "An Act for the Encour-
agement of Learning."10 
Early American enactments also focused on these twin goals: 
assuring authors their just deserts and encouraging authors to cre-
ate and disseminate works of social value.11 Thus, the preamble to 
Connecticut's 1783 copyright statute recites: 
Whereas it is perfectly agreeable to the principles of natural equity 
and justice, that every author should be secured in receiving the prof-
its that may arise from the sale of his works, and such security may 
encourage men of learning and genius to publish their writings; which 
may do honor to their country, and service to mankind.12 
Other preambles started with the need to provide encouragement 
to authors and moved to natural rights, "there being no property 
more peculiarly a man's own than that which is procured by the 
labour of his mind. "13 
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution focused on the instru-
mental justification for copyright, granting Congress the power 
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Trmes to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries."14 The first federal copy-
right statute maintained this focus on, "the encouragement of 
learning. "15 
Over the ensuing two centuries, as copyright protection has ex-
panded, each expansion has been accompanied by rhetoric cham-
pioning the needs of the deserving author, emphasizing the need to 
induce creative activity, or both. Thus, in 1831, when Congress 
8. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (Eng.). 
9. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (Eng.). 
10. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (Eng.). 
11. See generally 1 WILUAM F. PATRY, CoPYRIGHr LAW AND PRACTICE 21 (1994); Jane 
C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and 
America, 64 Tur.. L. REV. 991, 998-1002 (1990). 
12. 1783 Conn. Pub. Acts Jan. Sess., reprinted in U.S. CoPYRIGHr OFFICE, CoPYRIGHr 
ENACTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1783-1906, at 11 (2d ed. 1906). 
13. See, e.g., Mass. Act ofMar.17, 1783, reprinted in U.S. CoPYRIGHr OFFICE, supra note 
12, at 1, 4-15. 
14. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
15. See 1 Copyright Act of 1790, ch.15, 1Stat.124 (repealed 1831) (entitled "An Act for 
the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts and books, to the 
authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned"). 
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doubled the initial copyright term to twenty-eight years, the exten-
sion was dubbed "an act of pure justice," needed to ensure Ameri-
can authors treatment more similar to that accorded authors 
abroad.16 When the statute limited renewal rights to the author's 
surviving spouse and children, a member of Congress emphasized 
the plight of the author's family at the author's death.17 
The same pattern appears in the extensive debate over the 1909 
Act.1s In fighting provisions that explicitly would have exempted 
sheet-music rentals from charges of copyright violation, the Music 
Publishers' Association submitted a brief emphasizing both desert 
and incentive. The brief asked, rhetorically, "[W]hy should the ex-
clusive right of performance be denied to the creator of the work if 
he is to enjoy any exclusive rights because of his contribution to the 
knowledge and usefulness of mankind?"19 The brief went on to ar-
gue that any limitation on the composer's public-performance rights 
would "restrict the production of important musical works because 
of less encouragement to the composer."20 In pithier terms, com-
poser John Philip Sousa made the same points in a telegram to the 
chairman of the committee considering the copyright legislation: 
"Earnestly request that the American composer receives full and 
adequate protection for the product of his brain; any legislation that 
does not give him absolute control of that he creates is a return to 
the usurpation of might and a check on the intellectual develop-
ment of our country. "21 Invocation of these themes was not limited 
to debate over public-performance rights; similar themes were ad-
16. See 1 PATRY, supra note 11, at 465-66 (citations omitted). 
17. See id. at 466. 
18. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (amended 1976). 
19. Arguments on H.R. 11943 Before the House Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 
19, 19 (1906), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TIIE 1909 COPYRIGHT Acr pt. G. (E. 
Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
20. 4 id. at 20. 
21. 4 id. at 3. Sousa was not alone among American composers in emphasizing these dual 
themes. A Jetter signed by Victor Herbert and three others asked the committee to 
"[p]icture this brilliant and enjoyable scene [a magnificent church performance], but let us 
also not forget the one man whose brain and heart created the music and made the entertain-
ment possible." 4 id. at 21. The Herbert letter went on to suggest the need for incentives, 
noting that 
[w]hen copies of the music are rented or borrowed and not bought, all the composer gets 
is glory and applause. Now, glory is all well enough, and applause to most men is sweet. 
But we wish to say to you, gentlemen, that glory alone will not put a coat on that man's 
back; it will not help him to protect his wife; nor will glory alone clothe and feed his 
children. 
4 id. 
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vanced to support a longer copyright period22 and protection 
against mechanical reproduction of musical works.23 
Advocates of strong copyright protection - authors and law-
yers alike - hammered on the same principles during the long pro-
cess leading to the enactment of the 1976 Act.24 In a 1965 attack on 
a proposal to permit photocopying for educational purposes, novel-
ist Elizabeth Janeway wrote: "Our American society is founded on 
the principle that the one who creates something of value is entitled 
to enjoy the fruits of his labor."25 Ten years later, Irwin Karp, 
counsel for the Authors League of America, in arguing for a life-
plus-50-years copyright term, again emphasized that authors de-
serve compensation for value produced: "Some of the greatest lit-
erary, dramatic and musical works ... would not, even under life-
plus-50, provide their authors with adequate compensation for the 
value of their contributions to society. But these authors are enti-
tled to at least that much for themselves and their families. "26 
Rhetoric accompanying the 1976 Act also stressed economic ince~­
tives, as in the warning by a representative of a publishing group 
that if an exemption for educational photocopying were enacted, 
"the end result, in the aggregate, would be the erosion of entire 
markets for certain books .and periodicals and in many instances to 
22. Thus, in discussion at the Conference on Copyright convened by the Librarian of 
Congress as a prelude to preparation of the draft legislation, one participant, arguing for a 
life-plus-50-years term, said, "There is no reason under heaven why, in an act of this kind, the 
Republic should not treat its men of letters and its men of art in a way to bring them some 
concession for benefits which they have wrought." 1 id. pt. C, at 75. 
23. See, e.g., Letter from D.P. Lewandowski, M.D., to Senator Alfred B. Kittredge, 
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Patents (June 5, 1906), reprinted in 4 id. pt. H, at 59 
(complaining of "piracy" by phonographic reproduction) ("I feel how dreadful it is in general 
to suffer and to be deprived of remuneration for the just and intelligent inventive brain work 
which a man produces by his genius."). 
24. The process began with a 1961 report by the Register of Copyrights recommending 
revisions to the Copyright Act and culminated with enactment of the new statute in 1976. 
See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1994)). See generally 1 PATRY, supra note 11, at 74-89. 
25. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 Before Subcomm 
No. 3 of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 5 
GEORGE S. GROSSMAN, OMNIBUS COPYRIGIIT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 100 (1976) 
[hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835]; see also Hearings on H.R. 4347, 5680, 
6831, 6835, supra, at 93, reprinted in 5 GROSSMAN, supra, at 79 (statement of Rex Stout, 
President, Authors League of America) (arguing in favor of termination rights) {"The termi-
nation clause insures that the constitutional purpose of copyright, to provide incentive and 
reward to authors, is carried out"). 
26. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, 
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1975), reprinted in 14 GROSSMAN, supra note 25, at 352 (1975) (statement of Irwin Karp, 
Counsel, Authors League of America). 
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make the publishing of a work simply uneconomical."27 The warn-
ing went on to assert that the unfortunate economic effects of an 
exemption were not "mere specters or dramatics" but "inexorable 
conclusions drawn from the private enterprise system of our 
economy. "28 
Proponents of the most recent amendments to the copyright 
statute also have struggled valiantly to find economic justifications 
for the enactment. Thus, the committee report accompanying the 
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act29 asserts that 
"[p ]rotection for works of architecture should stimulate excellence 
in design, thereby enriching our public environment in keeping with 
the constitutional goal."30 Even in enacting the Visual Artists 
Rights Act,31 which extended a form of "moral rights" protection to 
works of art, the committee report managed to articulate an eco-
nomic justification: "The theory of moral rights is that they result 
in a climate of artistic worth and honor that encourages the author 
in the arduous act of creation."32 As with past enactments, advo-
cates of the recent amendments have advanced desert-based argu-
ments for expanding copyright protection.33 
The same rhetoric that has accompanied the legislative expan-
sion of copyright can be found in the Supreme Court's copyright 
opinions. From a superficial reading of the Court's opinions, one 
27. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and 
Copyrights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 12 
GROSSMAN, supra note 25, at 129 (1977) (statement of Ambassador Kenneth B. Keating, 
representing Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. and MacMillan, Inc.); see also Copyright Law 
Revision, 1965: Hearings on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copy-
rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 8 
GROSSMAN, supra note 25, at 65 (1976) (statement of Abraham L. Kaminstein, Register of 
Copyrights) ("The basic purpose of copyright protection is the public interest, to make sure 
that the wellsprings of creation do not dry up through lack of incentive, and to provide an 
alternative to the evils of an authorship dependent upon private or public patronage."). 
28. 12 GROSSMAN, supra note 25, at 130 (1977). 
29. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5133 
(1990) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-02, 120 (1994)). 
30. H.R. REP. No. 735, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1990). 
31. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A (1994)). 
32. H.R. REP. No. 514, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990) (quoting statement of Ralph Oman, 
Register of Copyrights); see also id. at 6 (quoting testimony from sculptor Weltzin B. Blix 
that incentives would diminish if there were a possibility that the works might be destroyed). 
33. See, e.g., Hearings Before Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin-
istration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1990) 
(statement of Richard Carney, Chief Executive Officer, Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation) 
("We feel that architecture is the mother art ••• and it's only just that architecture should be 
copyrighted."); see also 101 CoNo. REc. 12, 609-10 (1955) (Statement· of Representative 
Markey in support of V1Sual Artists Rights Act) ("Artists who work in painting, drawing, 
and sculpture are intellectual authors who deserve protection for their works."). 
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could get the impression that desert is irrelevant to copyright doc-
trine and that copyright rests solely on a utilitarian foundation. 
Thus, in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,34 the Court wrote 
that copyright's monopoly privileges "are neither unlimited nor pri-
marily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the 
limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may 
be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of au-
thors and inventors by the provision of a special reward."35 In 
Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises,36 the Court acknowledged 
former President Ford's efforts in preparing his memoirs, conclud-
ing "[i]t is evident that the monopoly granted by copyright actively 
served its intended purpose of inducing the creation of new mate-
rial of potential historical value. "37 Indeed, it is incentive language 
that pervades the Supreme Court's copyright jurisprudence.38 
But even the Supreme Court occasionally slips into language 
suggesting that desert is significant in copyright doctrine. Thus, in 
Mazer v. Stein,39 after emphasizing the incentive rationale for copy-
right, the Court closed its opinion by writing "sacrificial days de-
voted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with 
the services rendered. "40 In Harper & Row, the Court, again, after 
invoking an instrumental justification for copyright, acknowledged 
that "[t]he rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure con-
tributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors."41 
The remarkable persistence with which the same rhetoric has 
been used to support a wide variety of copyright protections is 
somewhat surprising and leads naturally to questions about whether 
and how often the rhetoric matches reality. To what extent do 
copyright incentives encourage creativ~ work? Whether or not par-
34. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
35. 464 U.S. at 429. 
36. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
37. 471 U.S. at 546. 
38. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. 
But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public 
good."); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the 
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encour-
agement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare 
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' "); United States v. 
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The copyright law, like the patent statutes, 
makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration ...• It is said that reward to the author 
or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius.''). 
39. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
40. 347 U.S. at 219 (emphasis added). 
41. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546-47. 
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ticular incentives actually encourage creativity, do courts and Con-
gress proceed as if the incentive justification underlies copyright, or 
is incentive rhetoric merely a fig leaf for protection that serves 
other, less lofty, interests? If desert serves as the foundation for 
copyright protection, what premises underlie the notion that au-
thors and their assignees "deserve" the array of statutory protec-
tions they have sought? The next two sections explore these 
questions. 
II. THE INCENTIVE JUSTIFICATION'S ROCKY ROAD 
Although the incentive justification for copyright law has both 
constitutional foundation and intuitive appeal, the match between 
the incentive justification and copyright doctrine has always been 
problematic. Moreover, doctrinal innovations of the last two de-
cades have exacerbated the disparity between doctrine and justifi-
cation. This section explores that growing gulf. 
A. The Economics of Copyright 
In a world without copyright, one would expect creative works 
to be underproduced. If the author of a creative work cannot pre-
vent copying, any potential copyist has an incentive to reproduce 
the creative work so long as the market price for the work is greater 
than the marginal cost of reproduction. As a result, the market 
price for copies of the work would approach the marginal cost of 
reproduction. If copies were indistinguishable in quality from the 
original, the market price for the original, too, would approach the 
marginal cost of reproduction. At that price, however, the author 
would realize no financial return on his investment in creating the 
work.42 In this world, only authors unconcerned with financial re-
turn would produce creative works.43 
Copyright combats underproduction of creative works by giving 
authors a property right in their creations. The property right, how-
ever, creates two new problems. First, the property right gives the 
42. The analysis assumes that copyists instantaneously can copy the original. If the au-
thor has significant lead-time advantages - advantages that are diminishing with improve-
ment in technology - and if purchasers are willing to pay a premium to obtain the work 
quickly, the author is in a position to obtain some financial return on his creative effort 
despite the copyist. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copy-
right in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 299-302 (1970). 
43. See generally Wiiliam M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of 
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL Sruo. 325, 328 (1989) (arguing that, when the price of a book is 
bid down to the marginal cost of copying, the book "probably would not be produced in the 
first place, because the author and publisher will not be able to recover their costs of creating 
the work"). 
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author, for the statutory period, monopoly power in the market for 
any work he has created and thus results in an undersupply, for that 
period, of copies of the work. Second, copyright protection, beyond 
modest limits, may begin to reduce the number of creative works 
produced because it constrains the right of authors to base their 
own work on preexisting copyrighted work. 
1. Copyright and the Market for Existing Works 
Consider first the effect of copyright protection on the market 
for existing works. Some copyright protection may be necessary to 
induce people to forego other opportunities in order to pursue crea-
tive work. Any copyright protection beyond that necessary to com-
pensate the author for lost opportunities would generate no 
additional incentive to create and would discourage production of 
additional copies even when the cost of producing those copies was 
less than the price consumers would be willing to pay.44 
To the extent that copyright protection eliminates copiers from 
the market, the original author becomes a monopolist in the market 
for his copies of his work.45 Assume that D represents the demand 
curve facing the monopolist-author (Figure 1). 
44. Of course, even if giving authors an expansive property right in their work created a 
deadweight loss, the right might be justified if no other mechanism were available to elimi-
nate that loss without also discouraging authors from creating new works. But there are a 
variety of mechanisms for limiting the scope of an author's monopoly. For instance, by ad-
justing the time period of the monopoly or by limiting the remedies available to an author for 
unauthorized copying, a copyright system might reduce deadweight losses without discourag-
ing authors from creating new works. 
45. The notion that copyright turns an author into a monopolist, of course, is subject to 
challenge. If one assumes that the works of one author are good substitutes for the works of 
another, then even with copyright, the market would be characterized by competition, not 
monopoly. The assumption that one work is a good substitute for another, however, under-
cuts the major premise of copyright law's economic justification: creative activity is a valua-
ble social good. If an existing work always furnishes a good substitute for a new work, then 
any energy spent creating new works would represent a waste of resources. Rather than 
producing new works - at high initial cost - society would be better off if we widely repro-
duced old works, at much lower cost 
Hence, the economic rationale for copyright protection - books and other creative 
works would be underproduced in a market without copyright - depends upon the assump-
tion that one book is not a complete substitute for another and that an author with a copy-
right does enjoy, to some degree, monopoly power. 
In practice, as William Fisher has noted, there is a spectrum between those books for 
which no adequate substitute exists and those for which there are nearly perfect substitutes. 
See William W. F!Sher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HAR.v. L. REv. 1659, 
1702-03 {1988). As a result, copyright gives each author at least some monopoly power, and 














Because the monopolist's curve typically is sloped negatively, un-
like the fiat demand curve facing a firm in a competitive market, 
each additional unit the author sells reduces the price the author 
can collect on all units sold. As a result, the marginal revenue the 
author derives from each additional copy sold is less than the price 
he receives for that copy. 
If the author stops distributing copies as soon as his marginal 
costs exceed his marginal revenues, he will distribute only x copies. 
Yet, for each additional copy distributed until y copies are distrib-
uted, there are consumers who would pay more than the cost of 
that copy. If marginal costs exceed average costs when x copies are 
produced, triangle ABC represents the deadweight loss. 
If, however, the initial cost of creating the work is high relative 
to the cost of making copies, average costs are likely to exceed mar-
ginal costs at all relevant quantities. The author would have to re-
ceive a price at least equal to the average cost in order to induce 
him to create the work in the first place. As a result, the dead-
weight loss copyright protection generates is better represented by 
triangle ADE. 
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2. Copyright and Incentives To Produce New Works 
As we have seen, so long as the cost of copying is low, some 
copyright protection is necessary to assure authors a financial re-
turn on the time and energy devoted to creative activity. If free-
riding copyists could appropriate the gain associated with works of 
authorship, some authors would find it worthwhile to abandon au-
thorship for other pursuits. By giving copyright protection to works 
of authorship, we increase the cost of copying, raise the return on 
creative authorship, and, at the margin, encourage more people to 
create. 
Although each additional increment in copyright protection in-
creases the return to authors and hence induces potential authors to 
give up other enterprises, the number of creative works produced 
will not be directly proportional to the level of copyright protection. 
We would expect each additional increment of protection to induce 
fewer additional authors to engage in creative work. That is, once 
returns to creative activity have become high relative to returns in 
other pursuits, more of the people who could be induced to engage 
in creative activity already would have done so. 
At the same time, expanded copyright protection increases the 
cost to authors by requiring them to obtain permission when they 
seek to build upon existing work. As Landes and Posner have 
pointed out, as the number of copyrighted works increases, the 
amount of material in the public domain falls, making it more ex-
pensive for authors to acquire the raw material necessary for creat-
ing new works.46 At relatively low levels of copyright protection, 
the effect of additional copyright protection on the public domain 
may be trivial; as copyright protection expands, however, the incre-
mental reduction in available source material is likely to be greater. 
At some point, giving authors additional copyright protection will 
reduce the supply of new works because the number of marginal 
authors deterred from creating by the high cost of source material 
will exceed the number encouraged to create by the increased value 
of a work associated with a marginal increase in copyright 
protection. 
Consider, for instance, the impact of changes in one variable as-
sociated with copyright - the duration of protection. Providing 
authors with twenty years of protection may induce authors to cre-
ate - and publishers to publish - many works that would never 
see the light of day without copyright protection. The benefits asso-
46. See Landes & Posner, supra note 43, at 342-43. 
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ciated with these works almost certainly would exceed the costs 
generated for subsequent authors by twenty years of protection. 
Suppose, however, we compare twenty years of protection with 
seventy-five years. Although the additional fifty-five years of pro-
tection may induce the publication of some works that would not 
have been published if copyright were to expire after twenty years, 
the marginal increase in publication due to the additional fifty-five 
years of protection almost certainly will be smaller than the in-
crease associated with the first twenty. At the same time, the im-
pact on the public domain would be far greater with seventy-five 
years of protection than with twenty. To restrict the right of current 
authors to build on materials created at any time since 1921 would 
inhibit creative activity far more than a prohibition on the use of 
works created since 1976. 
3. Copyright Enforcement 
Like any property-rights system, a copyright system requires an 
enforcement mechanism. Enforcement entails expenditure of so-
cial resources on litigation and on drafting agreements to obtain 
and structure rights to avoid litigation. 
Eliminating copyright protection would not entirely remove 
these costs. In the absence of copyright, authors and publishers 
might rely more heavily on contract to structure their transactions. 
An author, for instance, might refuse to show a work to a publisher 
unless the publisher contracted not to disseminate the work without 
making specified payments to the author. 
As a practical matter, however, authors - especially successful 
ones - could not, by separate contracts with each consumer of his 
work, restrict the consumer's right to copy the work or to incorpo-
rate it into the reader's own work.47 As a result, in a free-use re-
gime, negotiations rarely would occur between authors and 
consumers seeking to build on the author's work. By contrast, in a 
copyright regime, anyone seeking to reproduce a copyrighted work 
risks an infringement action unless he first negotiates with the copy-
right holder for permission to use the work. The result is more ne-
gotiations and, in those cases where a copier fails to secure 
clearance from the author, more litigation.48 
47. Authors or publishers might try to market books in the same way that some consumer 
software is currently marketed - packaged together with "shrinkwrap" license agreements. 
On the enforceability of these agreements in the software field, see Mark A. Lemley, Intellec-
tual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239 (1995). 
48. Indeed, current copyright law recognizes, in a number of ways, the costs of copyright 
enforcement. The first-sale doctrine embodied in § 109(a) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 
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4. Summary 
Copyright protection has serious costs. Copyright creates the 
deadweight social loss associated with monopoly power over distri-
bution of already-created works, it increases the cost of creating 
new works by making it costly to avoid infringing existing copy-
rights, and it requires an enforcement mechanism. Some form of 
copyright protection nevertheless may be desirable in order to in-
duce authors to create new works. It is critical, however, that no 
efficiency justification - other than administrative simplicity -
can support a copyright regime that gives authors protection that 
would not induce the creation of new works. Indeed, from an effi-
ciency standpoint, the optimal copyright system would not seek to 
maximize the number of works created but, in recognition of the 
costs of copyright, would withdraw protection even when margin-
ally more protection would result in a marginal increase in creative 
activity.49 
B. Traditional Doctrine 
If copyright law were founded on the incentive justification, one 
would expect doctrine to be most protective when economic incen-
tives are most necessary to generate creative activity and when the 
threat of monopoly power is least significant. One would neither 
expect - nor want - the match between economics and doctrine 
to be perfect; the administrative costs of fine tuning doctrine to pro-
vide precisely the right incentives to the right authors and publish-
ers would be astronomical. Nevertheless, one would expect 
doctrine to reflect, to some extent, the economics of copyright. 
Traditional doctrine, as developed by Congress and the courts, 
reveals an awareness that copyright protection creates monopoly 
power. When monopoly power poses the greatest threat to effi-
ciency or other values, a variety of doctrinal rules limit the protec-
tion available to authors. On the other hand, copyright doctrine 
shows little recognition of the other insight provided by economic 
§ 109(a) (1994), which permits the purchaser of a copy of a book or copyrighted book to 
resell or lend that copy without infringing the copyright, avoids the administrative nightmare 
that would result if every reseller or lender of a book were required to obtain copyright 
clearance. Similarly, by holding that copying television programs onto videocassette for pur-
poses of time shifting does not constitute infringement, the Supreme Court implicitly recog-
nized the enforcement problems that copyright protection would generate. See Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). The current debate over library photocopying 
reflects similar concerns about enforcement. See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco; 
Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
49. See Landes & Posner, supra note 43, at 343-44. 
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analysis: copyright protection serves no economic purpose when 
the protection is not necessary to induce authors to engage in crea-
tive activity. This section explores first, doctrinal limitations 
designed to limit monopoly power and second, the extent to which 
copyright law extends protection to authors even when that protec-
tion is unlikely to induce creative activity. 
1. Doctrinal Limitations Designed To Restrain Monopoly Power 
Three long-standing doctrinal limitations on copyright protec-
tion reflect a concern with the monopoly power that overbroad 
copyright doctrine generates. By refusing to extend protection to 
ideas,5o by developing the "fair-use" doctrine,51 and by treating util-
itarian articles as noncopyrightable,52 Congress and the courts have 
limited protection in areas where copyright would not generate in-
centives sufficient to warrant the losses associated with monopoly 
power. 
Consider first the refusal to protect ideas. Authors generate 
many ideas at zero cost from ordinary observation, general reading, 
and other activities they would pursue apart from any quest for pro-
fessional advantage. To give authors any monopoly over such ideas 
would serve no economic purpose; by hypothesis, authors would 
generate them without any incentive.53 Moreover, if copyright pro-
tection did extend to commonplace ideas, subsequent authors 
would produce less work because of the increased cost associated 
with a smaller public domain.54 Hence, commonplace ideas receive 
no independent protection; they are protected only as they are em-
bedded in an author's expression. 
Other ideas - a new bookkeeping system,ss a new computer 
algorithm, and the Pythagorean Theorem56 - may be generated 
only at considerable cost to the idea's "author." To ensure that au-
thors continue developing such ideas, copyright protection, at first 
glance, might appear appropriate. But because these ideas often 
50. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). 
51. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (codifying fair-use defense to infringement). 
52. See, e.g., Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985). 
53. See Landes & Posner, supra note 43, at 349-50 (noting that a novelist can acquire 
many ideas at zero cost from observation of the world around him or from works long in the 
public domain). 
54. See id. at 347-48; see also Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 17 
GEO: L.J. 287, 319-20 (1988) (noting that the pool of everyday ideas available to subsequent 
authors would be reduced if everyday ideas were protected). 
55. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). 
56. See Hughes, supra note 54, at 320. 
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have many applications, their economic value may be high relative 
to the cost of producing them. A grant to the author of monopoly 
power over all uses of these applications would ensure an economic 
return beyond that which would have been necessary to induce the 
author to engage in creative activity, while at the same time increas-
ing the price of the idea to potential consumers, thus making the 
idea less available.57 Copyright's compromise is to give the author 
a monopoly only to the extent that the idea is incorporated into a 
particular expression; if the idea cannot be separated from the ex-
pression, the author receives no copyright protection. 
The "fair-use" doctrine, too, limits copyright protection when 
the dangers of monopoly power are great and the need to provide 
additional incentive to the copyright holder is small. Section 107 of 
the Copyright Act provides that fair use of a copyrighted work "for 
purposes such. as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright."58 The 
statute goes on to list factors relevant in determining whether a use 
is "fair," including the "substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole" and "the effect of the use upon 
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."59 
Because a use is unlikely to be considered "fair" if it would af-
fect the market for the copyrighted work significantly,60 the fair-use 
doctrine should not dissuade many authors from engaging in crea-
tive work. At the same time, the fair-use doctrine eliminates the 
transaction costs that might prevent subsequent authors from quot-
ing copyrighted work to enrich their own.61 Were it not for fair use, 
an author who made even brief reference to the work of others, 
whether for purposes of exposition, analysis, or criticism, might be 
required to secure approval, in advance, from the holders of copy-
57. See Landes & Posner, supra note 43, at 351. 
58. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (1994). 
59. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (1994). 
60. See Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (characterizing the 
effect of a use on the market for the original as "undoubtedly the single most important 
element of fair use"). But cf. Wtlliam F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: 
Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. J. 667, 693-97 (1993) (criticiz-
ing the Court's emphasis on market effect). 
61. See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding 
that fair-use analysis appropriately focuses on whether a practical licensing scheme effec-
tively could reduce the transaction costs associated with obtaining permission for reproduc-
tion of journal articles); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and 
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1627-
32 (1982); Landes & Posner, supra note 43, at 357-58; see also Fisher, supra note 45, at 1724-
25 (noting transaction costs but also noting that a licensing scheme might reduce those costs 
significantly). 
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rights in earlier works. The likely result would be less commentary 
on past works. Moreover, the importance of fair use is not limited 
to transaction costs; without the doctrine, authors would be able to 
suppress unwanted parody or criticism of their own work.62 Effec-
tive parody or criticism often requires quotation from the original,63 
and, were it not for the fair-use doctrine, the original author could 
use its monopoly power to prevent that quotation.64 Thus, the fair-
use doctrine makes it easier for authors to build upon - and to 
attack - prior works, without reducing the incentive for the crea-
tion of original works. As a limitation on copyright protection, the 
doctrine is quite consistent with the economic concern about re-
straining monopoly power. 
Although the Supreme Court, in Mazer v. Stein, 65 held that a 
work of art does not lose copyright protection merely because it is 
· incorporated into a useful article - in Mazer, a lamp base -
neither Congress nor the courts have been willing to extend copy-
right protection to the design of useful products. Thus, courts have 
held uncopyrightable mannequins used to display clothing66 and a 
wire sculpture adapted for use as a bicycle rack.67 
This limitation on copyright protection, too, appears generally 
consistent with the incentive justification for copyright. First, if 
copyright is designed to reduce free riding, copyright is most critical 
when the cost of copying is low relative to the cost of initial crea-
tion. 68 For bike racks, mannequins, and other manufactured prod-
ucts, however, the cost of copying is not likely to be low: to profit 
from someone else's design, a free-riding manufacturer must invest 
in the machinery and raw materials necessary to make the product, 
materials likely to be more expensive than the paper and ink used 
to copy a book. Second, incentives other than copyright exist for a 
manufacturer to invest in attractive product design. In particular, 
an appealing product design is likely to generate more customers 
62. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 114 S. a. 1164 (1994) (noting that the role of 
courts in fair-use cases is to distinguish between biting criticism, which suppresses demand of 
a copyrighted work, and infringement, which usurps demand for the work); see also Gordon, 
supra note 61, at 1632-35. 
63. See Acuff-Rose Music, 114 S. a. at 1176 ("When parody takes aim at a particular 
original work, the parody must be able to 'conjure up' at least enough of that original to 
make the object of its critical wit recognizable."). See generally WILUAM F. PATRY, THE 
FAIR UsE Pruv!LEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 167 (2d ed. 1995). 
64. See Fisher, supra note 45, at 1730-31 & n.303. 
65. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
66. See Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985). 
67. See Brandir Intl. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). 
68. See generally supra section II.A.1. 
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than an indifferent design.69 At the same time, the monopoly 
power associated with copyright protection might create even 
greater inefficiencies if designers were given a monopoly over use-
ful articles than when the monopoly is limited to artistic works. The 
fact that patent protection is more difficult to obtain and endures 
for a shorter period than copyright protection suggests that Con-
gress is more concerned about extending monopoly power over 
useful articles.70 Hence, reluctance to extend protection to the de-
sign of useful articles appears generally consistent with the eco-
nomic justification for copyright. 
2. Copyright Doctrine and the Need To Provide Incentives 
a. Copyrightable Subject Matter 
Although the deadweight losses a copyright monopoly creates 
might be greater in some areas than in others, all monopoly power 
creates some inefficiencies. Hence, from an efficiency standpoint, 
copyright is justifiable only to the extent that copyright protection is 
necessary to induce additional creative activity.71 Not all "authors" 
need copyright protection to induce them to create. For instance, 
giving copyright protection to personal snapshots or home videos is 
unlikely to have any impact on their volume. People who take 
snapshots and videos expect no financial return and would engage 
in the same behavior without regard to the availability of copyright 
protection. By contrast, for authors and publishers of trade books 
or textbooks, financial gain is a significant motivation, and one 
might expect copyright to generate more publication and more cre-
ative activity.n That is, if copyright is designed to provide incen-
tives, there is greater' reason to extend copyright protection to 
authors of books than to home-video photographers. 
Congress and the courts, however, have made few efforts to 
limit copyright protection to those areas in which incentives are 
69. See Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to 
Copyright in Useful Articles, 61 MINN. L. REV. 707, 723 (1983). 
70. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (novelty requirement for patents); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) 
(requirement that subject matter be "non-obvious"); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994) (20-year term for 
patents). 
71. Indeed, even when additional copyright protection would induce creative activity, ex-
tending that protection still would be inefficient if gains from the creative activity would be 
outweighed by the higher costs associated with works that would have been produced even 
without the additional protection. See Landes & Posner, supra note 43, at 343. 
72. Twenty-five years ago, however, now-Justice Breyer wrote a penetrating article ques-
tioning the need for copyright protection even in the book-publishing industry. See Breyer, 
supra note 42. Breyer emphasized that a variety of factors other than copyright give original 
authors an advantage over copiers, making the case for copyright protection "uneasy." 
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likely to have an effect on the level of creative activity. More than a 
century ago, Congress added photographs to the list of protected 
works,73 and the Supreme Court, in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. 
v. Sarony, 74 upheld the statute against a constitutional challenge 
contending that a photograph is not a writing within the Constitu-
tion's meaning. Would photographers - be they commercial, stu-
dio, or free-lance - take fewer or less artistic photographs without 
that protection? The answer most certainly is "no" in each case. 
Each category of photographer works to satisfy clients who will pay 
more for photographers with a reputation for high quality work. 
Given the small chance that any particular photograph will find a 
market beyond its immediate intended purpose, copyright protec-
tion is unlikely to have any impact on the volume or quality of pho-
tography. At the same time, if the unusual photograph of enduring 
value does enjoy copyright protection, the photograph will be less 
available and more costly to the general public.1s 
Copyright protection for commercial advertisements has even 
less economic justification. Advertising is generally designed to dif-
ferentiate the advertiser's product or service from others on the 
market. That differentiation might be based on price, quality, or 
more ephemeral characteristics. If an advertiser's overwhelming 
objective is to sell products or services by differentiating them from 
others on the market, what effect does copyright protection have? 
Even if no protection were available, it would do an advertiser little 
good to copy a competitor's ads wholesale; copycat ads would give 
consumers little reason to buy one product rather than another. 
Hence, even if copyright protection for advertisements were un-
available, no advertising writer concerned about future employ-
ment would stint on creativity.76 Yet, in Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co.,77 the Supreme Court, over a dissent, held that 
73. See Amendment to an Act to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, 13 Stat. 533 
(1865); see also 1 PATRY, supra note 11, at 43. 
74. 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
75. Cf. Tune Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (empha-
sizing the public interest in having full infonnation about President Kennedy's assassination 
and upholding as "fair use" a book's use of photographs made from Abraham Zapruder's 
home movies of the assassination). 
76. Moreover, in an environment where the cost of advertising space in the media may 
dwarf the monies spent on the creative aspects of an ad campaign and where advertisers feel 
the competitive need to change campaigns frequently, the claim that copyright induces crea-
tivity in advertising becomes especially implausible. 
77. 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
March 1996] Rhetoric in Copyright 1215 
the design of a commercial advertisement was copyrightable subject 
matter.78 
In general, when an author creates a work with one market in 
mind, the incentive justification fails as a reason to give the author 
monopoly power in another market; the author would have created 
the work even without the prospect of monopoly. Of course, no 
formula identifies cases in which the prospect of reward in a partic-
ular market motivated the author, so a rule denying authors copy-
right for works produced for a particular market would be a 
nightmare to administer.79 What is important about cases like 
Sarony and Bleistein is that they offered Congress and the Court an 
opportunity to deny copyright protection to easily defined catego-
ries of works when copyright is unlikely to provide any incentive for 
creative activity. By declining to act on the opportunity, Congress 
and the Court cast doubt on their allegiance to the incentive justifi-
cation, thus indicating a willingness to condone monopoly even 
when it is unsupported by the need to induce more creative activity .. 
b. Derivative Works 
The Copyright Act,80 following the 1909 Act and preexisting 
case law, gives the owner of a copyright the exclusive right "to pre-
pare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work."81 Why 
give the author of a book the exclusive right to prepare a movie 
version? Why give the creator of a cartoon the exclusive right to 
create stuffed toys or piggy banks based on the cartoon's charac-
ters? Giving an author the exclusive rights to prepare derivative 
works extends the author's monopoly. Does the need to provide 
authors with an incentive to produce justify such an extension? 
One argument for giving authors copyright in derivative works 
is that the prospect of profits from derivative works is necessary to 
create adequate incentives for production of the original. The argu-
ment is persuasive only in those situations when (1) the projected 
returns from the original work are too small to justify the costs of 
production, and (2) the projected returns from the derivative work 
are so large relative to the cost of producing the derivative work 
78. For an article arguing that Bleistein should be legislatively overruled, see Douglas 0. 
Linder & James W. Howard, Why Copyright Law Should Not Protect Advertising, 62 OR. L. 
REV. 231 (1983). 
79. Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 43, at 344 (emphasizing the importance of adminis-
tration and enforcement costs in any copyright system). 
80. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1994). 
81. 17 u.s.c. § 106(2) (1994). 
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that the difference will more than make up the projected deficit on 
the original work alone. These conditions may apply when the orig-
inal work is an extraordinarily high-budget movie with the potential 
for sales of toys, t-shirts, and the like, but they are less likely to 
apply in more common derivative-works cases. 
Consider, for instance, the argument that an exclusive right to 
produce a movie version is necessary to ensure production of the 
book. For an author's first book, potential movie royalties are un-
likely to be a significant factor either in the decision to write or in 
the decision to publish. Indeed, because the chance that movie 
rights to the book will command a high price is infinitesimally small, 
any first author who makes movie royalties a critical factor in decid-
ing whether to write is almost certainly misperceiving his own inter-
ests. - If movie royalties were simply unavailable, the overly 
optimistic first author might make more rational calculations. For 
books by a more established author, movie rights may well have 
significant value. But for the established author, revenues from the 
book alone generally will be enough to keep the author writing, 
unless the author has other opportunities that are more remunera-
tive. 82 For most established authors, movie rights represent a form 
of economic rent. Hence, it is not surprising that even Landes and 
Posner, in attempting to justify derivative-works protection, reject 
the argument that protection is necessary to ensure that authors re-
cover their costs.83 
Landes and Posner offer two other economic justifications for 
giving an author exclusive rights in derivative works, but both are 
unpersuasive. First, they argue that denying derivative-rights pro-
tection to original authors would delay production of the original 
work so that the authors simultaneously could prepare the deriva-
tive work.84 By the same token, however, giving protection to origi-
nal authors may cause them to delay production of the derivative 
work in order to increase sales of the original. That is, for those 
82. Even when returns on the original work are currently dwarfed by returns on the de-
rivative work, it is not inevitable that the author would stop writing or the publisher would 
stop publishing if derivative work protection were abolished. ·The market might adapt to 
changing legal conditions. For instance, legal treatises and other trade books frequently are 
written and published to sell at relatively low prices, with the expectation that captive con-
sumers later will pay higher prices for "updates" that authors can produce, cheaply and 
quickly. If the updates were not protected as derivative works, authors and publishers might 
face competition in the production of updates. As a result, the price of the original work 
might rise to reflect the cost of production. Consumers, however, would be likely to recog-
Iiize that this higher cost would be offset by lower maintenance costs. If they do, eliminating 
derivative-works protection would have little impact on the production of these works. 
83. See Landes & Posner, supra note 43, at 354. 
84. See id. at 355. 
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who prefer the movie version to the book version but want one of 
the two quickly, the author may obtain two sales if, armed with mo-
nopoly power, he delays the movie version until the book market 
has been tapped out. It is not apparent why this problem is less 
serious than the timing problem emphasized by Landes and Posner. 
Second, Landes and Posner argue that giving derivative rights to 
the original owner reduces transaction costs by requiring a pub-
lisher who wants to bring out a new translation of a previously 
translated work to deal with only one copyright holder rather than 
two. 85 On this point, they are simply wrong. If the copyright in the 
original did not extend to derivative works, the publisher of the 
translation would not have to obtai.µ the original author's consent. 
Hence, giving the original author an exclusive right in derivative 
works does nothing to reduce transaction costs. 
If derivative-works protection has any significant economic ba-
sis, that basis must rest on the administrative difficulty of distin-
guishing preparation of a derivative work from copying an original 
work. That is, suppose a translation were to include a verbatim 
transcript of the original work. Even if derivative works were not 
protected, the translation nevertheless might be treated as an in-
fringement of the original work. What if the translation includes 
significant passages of, but not the entire, original work? These 
boundary-line determinations are not necessary under current law, 
but they might be if derivative-works protection were abolished. 
Even under current law, this sort of boundary-line determination is 
a staple of infringement litigation. It is far from clear that abolish-
ing derivative-works protection would increase overall litigation 
rather than just shift the boundary lines. 
The broad protection copyright doctrine extends to derivative 
works, then, appears generally inconsistent with the incentive justi-
fication for copyright. Derivative-works protection extends the 
copyright monopoly without generating significant incentives for 
creative activity. 
c. Renewal and Termination Rights 
From 1790, when the first federal copyright statute was enacted, 
until 1976, copyright protection was divided into two terms: an 
original term and a renewal term.86 This division of copyright into 
85. See id. 
86. The Copyright Act of 1790 provided for a 14-year copyright term, followed by a 14-
year renewal term. The renewal term was available only if the author was still alive at the 
expiration of the original term. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § l, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (re-
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two terms apparently was designed to increase the chance that the 
author would derive financial benefit from a work of enduring 
value. Th.us, the legislative history accompanying the 1909 Act, in 
rejecting a proposal for a single c_opyright term, emphasized that: 
It not infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright outright 
to a publisher for a comparatively small sum. If the work proves to be 
a great success and lives beyond the term of twenty-eight years, your 
committee felt that it should be the exclusive right of the author to 
take the renewal term, and the law should be framed as is the existing 
law, so that he could not be deprived of that right.87 
In other words, the two-term formulation was designed to ensure 
that the author who makes an outright sale of his copyright will get 
a second shot at remuneration if the work is a long-term success.88 
Does the division of copyright protection into two terms induce 
authors to engage in more creative activity? The answer is almost 
certainly "no": either the bifurcation of protection would have no 
effect on creative activity, or it would reduce the incentive to create 
by decreasing the value of copyrights to publishers. 
If authors were free to assign their renewal rights at the same 
time they assigned the original copyright, bifurcation could have no 
effect on author incentives. An author willing to assign a single 
fifty-six-year copyright to a publisher would be equally willing to 
assign two twenty-eight-year copyrights. Similarly, an author who 
would be willing to assign only the initial twenty-eight-year copy-
right in a bifurcated system would be free, in a system that gives 
authors a single fifty-six-year term, to grant only a single twenty-
eight-year license. Moreover, in a system of free assignment, con-
pealed 1831). In 1831, Congress expanded the original tenn to 28 years and made the 14-
year renewal tenn available to the author's widow or children if the author did not survive 
the original tenn. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 436 (amended 1909). The 
1909 Act extended the renewal tenn to 28 years, see Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 
Stat. 1075, 1080 (amended 1976), after congressional committees rejected a proposal to sub-
stitute a single, longer copyright tenn. See H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 
(1909); S. REP. No. 1108, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1909). 
87. H.R. REP. No. 2222 at 14-15. 
A similar justification appeared in the committee report accompanying the earlier 1831 
Copyright Act, which expanded copyright protection by giving a renewal right to the family 
of an author even if the author did not survive until the end of the initial period: "The 
question is, whether the author or the bookseller shall reap the reward." 7 CoNo. DEB. app. 
CXIX (1831). 
88. At hearings accompanying the 1909 Act, a congressman referred to a conversation 
with Mark Twain during which 1\vain supposedly indicated that much of the benefit he de-
rived from copyright came during the renewal period. See Hearings on Pending Bills to 
Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright Before the Senate and House Comms. 
on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 20, 62 (1908), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 19, pt. K (Statement of Rep. Currier). 
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cems about unequal bargaining power89 would be misplaced: any 
publisher able to use bargaining power to extract assignment of a 
fifty-six-year copyright would be able to use the same bargainillg 
power to demand assignment of the twenty-eight-year original term 
and assignment of the right to renew upon expiration of the original 
period.90 In Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, lnc.,91 how-
ever, the Supreme Court held that an author was not entirely free 
to assign renewal rights under the 1909 Act. The Court noted that 
the copyright statute vested renewal rights in the author only if the 
author were "still living" and otherwise vested those rights in the 
author's widow and children, if living, or in the executor or next of 
kin. Because the author did not survive until expiration of the ini-
tial period, the Court concluded that the author's prior assignment 
was ineffective. 
Commentators have long suggested that the market value of the 
renewal term, measured at the beginning of the initial term, is near 
zero.92 If so, denying authors an absolute right to assign the re-
newal term would have no effect on author incentives. If, however, 
an author's renewal right does have value, the Court in Miller 
Music, by treating the renewal right as a contingent interest, re-
duced the value of the bundle of rights an author could sell to a 
publisher. That reduction, if it had any effect on authors at all, 
would produce a disincentive to engaging in creative activity.93 
89. See Fred FJSher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 654 (1943) (rejecting 
the argument that "authors are congenitally irresponsible, that frequently they are so sorely 
pressed for funds that they are willing to sell their work for a mer~ pittance, and therefore 
assignments made by them should not be upheld"). 
90. Conversely, authors with enough bargaining power to prevent assignment of a re-
newal term also would be able to limit assignment to the first 28 years of a 56-year term. 
Even those concerned about the inequality of bargaining power of authors and publishers are 
willing to concede that there might be some authors with power to bargain around provisions 
in form contracts. See Marci A. Hamilton, Comment, Commissioned Works as Works Made 
for Hire Under the 1976 Copyright Ac4 Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 
1281, 1309 (1987). 
91. 362 U.S. 373 (1960). , 
92. See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: II, 45 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 719, 721 (1945). 
93. Moreover, the uncertainty the Supreme Court created about ownership interests in 
the renewal term also generated disincentives for another group of authors: potential cre-
ators of derivative works. 1\venty years into the initial copyright term of a book, the book's 
author, if alive, could not assure a potential moviemaker of copyright protection that would 
last beyond eight years. Even if the book author assigned all rights in the renewal period, the 
moviemaker would have been limited to an eight-year monopoly if the author died before 
the expiration of the initial period. Cf. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990). The 1976 Act 
since has been amended to ensure that "a derivative work prepared under authority of a 
grant of a transfer or license of the copyright that is made before the expiration of the origi-
nal term of copyright may continue to be used under the terms of the grant during the re-
newed and extended term of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(4)(A) (1994). 
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Hence, bifurcation of the copyright term hardly seemed consistent 
with the incentive justification for copyright protection.94 
Although the 1976 Act substitutes a single life-plus-fifty-years 
term for the bifurcation between the original and renewal term, the 
termination provision in the new statute95 preserves and perhaps 
even expands the disincentive created by prior law. Under prior 
law, an author's assignment of the renewal term bound the author if 
the author survived until the end of the renewal term but did not 
bind the author's statutory successors if the author did not sur-
vive.96 Under the new statute, not even the author himself is fully 
bound by his own assignment of his copyright. Instead, the author 
is entitled, after thirty-five years, to terminate an assignment.97 As 
a result, any publisher knows that any copyrights it has acquired, if 
valuable, will expire after thirty-five years. Nothing in the statute 
prevents publishers from taking that fact into account in setting the 
prices they are willing to pay to authors. Thus, like renewal rights 
under prior law, the 1976 Act's termination provision is difficult to 
justify as an incentive to creative efforts. 
d. Feist and the Originality Requirement: The Incentive 
Justification Turned Upside Down. 
Works of significant value may be generated by a random crea-
tive spark or by sustained, sometimes tedious effort. The incentive 
justification for copyright would suggest that protection is more im-
portant for works whose production requires great effort than for 
works whose production requires a spark of genius.98 People gen-
erally need incentives to engage in tedious efforts; the need for in-
centives is much less clear when a work's success is more 
94. Although the 1976 Act introduced a single copyright tenn, its provision for tennina-
tion rights duplicated some of the features of the renewal provisions under prior law. For 
discussion of the tennination right, see infra section III.A.2. 
95. 17 u.s.c. § 203 (1994). 
96. Compare Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943) (holding 
the assignment of renewal tenn by original author binding when original author is alive at 
time for renewal) with Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960) 
(holding that the original author's assignment of renewal rights does not cut off rights of 
statutory successor if author dies before renewal time). 
97. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1994). 
98. Indeed, generating the appropriate incentives for works of inspiration is notoriously 
difficult. For instance, generous federal government support for art and artists - particu-
larly during the great Depression - has been attacked for producing mediocrity. See Marci 
A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 V AND. L. REv. 74, 112-19 (forthcoming 1996) [hereinafter Ham-
ilton, Art Speech]. 
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attributable to random sparks than to sustained effort.99 Neverthe-
less, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,100 the 
Supreme Court appeared to suggest that originality - not effort -
is a necessary predicate for copyright protection. An originality re-
quirement appears entirely inconsistent with the incentive justifica-
tion for copyright. 
In Feist, the Court held that a Kansas public utility was not enti-
tled to copyright protection for the white-pages telephone directory 
it had published. Concluding that "[t]he sine qua non of copyright 
is originality"101 and that originality requires "at least some mini-
mal degree of creativity,"102 the Court held that the selection and 
arrangement of the utility's directory was not sufficiently creative to 
qualify for copyright protection. In the course of its opinion, the 
Court expressly disapproved the "sweat-of-the-brow" theory of 
copyright protection103 and suggested that effort alone, without cre-
ativity, would be insufficient to entitle an author to copyright 
protection.104 
Although the result in Feist is extraordinarily attractive, the 
Court's opinion is entirely inconsistent with the incentive justifica-
tion for copyright. Because generating a directory is so tedious -
unless the "author" already has all the. data, as the public utility did 
in Feist1D5 - no one is likely to engage in the task without some 
assurance of financial return. Because the effort involved in copy-
99. The role of effort in creating works of genius is not well understood. As Howard 
Gardner has written: "Some of the artists who have left records of their thoughts about their 
work have emphasized the effortless ways in which ideas fl.ow from their unconscious and are 
then mysteriously organized; creation emerges as an autonomous process requiring little will 
or intention on the creator's part" HOWARD GARDNER, THE ARTS AND HUMAN DEVELOP-
MENT 268 (1973). On the other hand, Gardner notes evidence of effortful labor by some of 
these artists, see id. at 269, and ultimately concludes that artistic creation should be conceived 
as "a practice of problem-solving within a given medium," id. at 270. 
100. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
101. 499 U.S. at 345. 
102. 499 U.S. at 345. 
103. See 499 U.S. at 352-61. 
104. For a discussion of Feist indicating that condemnation of "sweat-of-the-brow" rea-
soning was unnecessary to reach the Court's result, see Marci A. Hamilton, Justice 
O'Connor's Opinion in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.: An Uncom-
mon Though Characteristic Approach, 38 J. COPYRIGHT Soc. 83 (1991). 
105. Rural Telephone Service, the publisher of the "original" directory, did not have to 
expend much sweat to compile the directory. As holder of the monopoly telephone franchise 
in the area, Rural had at its disposal all of the telephone numbers of its subscribers and hence 
enjoyed a substantial advantage over competitors like Feist, who had no similar access to the 
raw data. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 342-43. Indeed, by statute, Rural was required to prepare the 
directory for which it claimed copyright protection. Yet, Rural attempted to argue that the 
copyright laws required Feist to compile its own directory from scratch - a result that would 
have given Rural and comparable monopoly franchisees a substantial cost advantage in the 
publication of directories. 
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ing the directory is negligible compared to the effort in compiling it, 
the potential for free-riding copiers is especially high, reducing the 
expected return for any prospective compiler and consequently the 
likelihood that any compiler will compile. Finally, the dangers of 
monopoly are small when the original work required no creativity 
to produce: by definition, anyone, however dull, could duplicate 
precisely the original directory by returning to original sources and 
duplicating the efforts of the original compiler. 
Despite the expansive language in Feist, perhaps the opinion 
was meant to be limited to its facts. The Court, after all, empha-
sized that the "vast majority of compilations" should qualify as orig-
inal works of authorship106 and that protection would be denied 
only to "a narrow category of works in which the creative spark is 
utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent."101 But to 
the extent that the opinion definitively rejects "sweat-of-the-brow" 
protection, the Court undermined the incentive justification for 
copyright.108 
C. The 1976 Act and More Recent Changes 
One might try to reconcile traditional copyright doctrine \vith 
the incentive justification by emphasizing the administrative costs 
of fine tuning a system to provide protection only when necessary 
to induce creative activity. One might point to fair use,109 the idea-
expression dichotomy,11° and the refusal to extend protection to 
useful articles111 as evidence that courts and Congress have recog-
nized the importance of limiting copyright doctrine when monopoly 
power is most threatening. 
However plausible that defense of traditional doctrine, a 
number of copyright innovations introduced in the 1976 Act and 
subsequent amendments are thoroughly inconsistent with an incen-
tive theory of copyright. This section examines three such 
innovations. 
106. See 499 U.S. at 359. 
107. 499 U.S. at 359. 
108. The Court did not explicitly prohibit state law regulation, through unfair-
competition law, of copying that appropriates the sweat of another's brow, but the Copyright 
Act's broad preemption provision, see 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994), raises questions about the 
permissible scope of state regulation. 
109. See supra text accompanying notes 58-64. 
110. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57. 
111. See supra text accompanying notes 65-70. 
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1. Extension of the Copyright Period 
Before enactment of the 1976 Act, an author was entitled to a 
copyright term of twenty-eight years, together with one renewal 
term, for a total of fifty-six years.112 Under the 1976 Act, by con-
trast, a copyright endures until fifty years after the author's 
death.113 Thus, if a forty-year-old author writes a book and lives to 
the age of eighty, the book will not enter the public domain until 
ninety years after its creation. , 
The new statute more closely approximates the period applica-
ble elsewhere in the world, and it clearly rewards authors who cre-
ate works of enduring value. But is this reward necessary to induce 
authors to create such works? The answer is almost certainly "no." 
For the extended period to operate as an effective incentive to in-
creased creative activity, there must be some authors who would 
not have created with the fifty-six years of copyright protection 
available under the old statute but who would create with the life-
plus-fifty scheme currently available. But only an author with ex-
treme confidence in his own success would worry about the rights 
to his work more than fifty-six years into the future; the overwhelm-
ing majority of copyrighted works will have no economic value after 
fifty-six years.114 Moreover, any author who expects his work to 
have significant value fifty-six years from now is likely to expect 
more immediate rewards as well; few works remain undiscovered or 
unpopular for half a century, only to catch the public imagination 
long after their creation. An author who expects his work to be 
successful immediately is unlikely to abstain from creating because 
he will not be able to retain a monopoly after fifty-six years have 
expired - especially given the small present value of the revenues 
that might be derived fifty-six years from now.115 Even if an author 
were so respected that the present value of future copyright protec-
tion were not trivial, the author could not realize that value cur-
rently because of the termination provisions in the new statute.116 
112. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (amended 1976). 
113. See 17 U.S.C. § 302{a) (1994). When a work is anonymous, pseudonymous, or a 
work made for hire, the copyright endures for 75 years from first publication or 100 years 
from creation, whichever comes first. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) {1994). 
114. A House Report accompanying the 1976 A.ct put the number at 85%. See H.R. REP. 
No. 1476., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 136 {1976). 
115. Thus, assuming an interest rate of six percent, the present value of the right to re-
ceive a dollar 50 years from now is just over five cents; at an interest rate of ten percent, the 
present value of that dollar would be less than a penny. 
116. See infra section IIl.A.2. 
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Of course, society suffers no economic harm if the author re-
tains a monopoly on the use of a work that has lost all economic 
value. But for those few enduring works that do retain economic 
value after fifty-six years, copyright protection will result in the 
usual deadweight social losses that result from monopoly pricing . 
. Thus, extension of the period will cause economic losses that are 
entirely unnecessary to achieve the supposed purpose of copyright 
- "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."117 
2. Elimination of the Statutory Notice Requirement 
Although the 1976 Act retained the requirement that published 
copies of copyrighted works include a notice of copyright as a con-
dition of obtaining copyright protection, Congress eliminated the 
notice requirement when it enacted the Berne Convention Imple-
mentation Act of 1988.118 
The notice requirement had been a feature of American copy-
right law since 1802.119 Although the notice requirement served a 
number of functions, perhaps the most important was its role in 
screening out of the copyright system those works in which the au-
thor had no desire for protection.120 That is, if the author of a pub-
lished work chose not to affix a copyright notice to the work, the 
work fell into the public domain and became available for public 
reproduction without charge. Since 1988, however, every author of 
an original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of ex-
pression automatically receives copyright protection, whether or 
not the author wanted that protection at the time the work was cre-
ated. The result is a smaller public domain and greater monopoly 
power iµ authors. 
Elimination of the notice requirement did not generate any cor-
responding incentive to engage in creative activity. Those authors 
motivated by the prospect of copyright protection, in any regime, 
117. U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. 
118. Copyright Act of 1976, § 401(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2576, amended by Berne Convention 
Implementation Act of 1988, § 7(a), 402 Stat. 2853, 2854 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) 
(1994)). 
119. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1976). 
120. The legislative history accompanying the 1976 Act listed this function first among 
the four identified functions of the notice requirement: 
(1) It has the effect of placing in the public domain a substantial body of published 
material that no one is interested in copyrighting; 
(2) It informs the public as to whether a particular work is copyrighted; 
(3) It identifies the copyright owner; and 
(4) It shows the date of publication. 
H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 143. 
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would have taken the steps necessary to ensure that· ·protection. 
Those were the authors most likely to seek professional advice and 
to include the requisite statutory notice. Elimination of the notice 
requirement principally protects those authors who create without 
copyright protection in mind - the very people who do not need 
the copyright incentive to create. 
Consider for instance, the famous "I have a dream" speech 
made by Dr. Martin Luther King during the 1963 Civil Rights 
March on Washington. It seems obvious that King would have 
made that speech even if he had been informed explicitly that no 
copyright protection was available. Indeed, when King made the 
speech, he distributed copies to members of the press without in-
cluding any copyright notice.121 Under the current statute, King 
would hold a copyright in the speech even though he wrote it with 
the hope that it would be disseminated, for free, to as broad an 
audience as possible and even though he made no claim to copy-
right protection. Perhaps that is the right result on some ground,122 
but King did not need a copyright incentive to make the speech. A 
notice requirement at least would shield the public from copyright 
monopoly when financial gain occurs to an author only as an after-
thought, not as a motivating factor. 
3. Protection of Architectural Works 
Until 1990, the Copyright Act provided no explicit protection 
for architectural works. Architectural plans were themselves copy-
rightable writings, but copyright law did not prevent the copying of 
a building constructed from those plans. As one court summarized 
the law: "[O]ne may construct a house which is identical to a house 
depicted in copyrighted architectural plans, but one may not di-
rectly copy those plans and then use the infringing copy to construct 
the house. "123 The principal resistance to extending copyright pro-
tection to buildings themselves was the fear that protecting useful 
articles - buildings - "would give architects unwarranted monop-
oly powers with the result that the costs of houses and other build-
ings would rise unnecessarily."124 
121. See King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
122. The court held King entitled to copyright protection because delivery of the speech 
to members of the press and, in public, to 200,000 people did not constitute general publica-
tion within the meaning of the 1909 Act. See 224 F. Supp. at 107. The court started with the 
proposition that "it seems unfair and unjust for defendants to use the voice and the words of 
Dr. King without his consent and for their own financial profit." 224 F. Supp. at 105. 
123. Robert R. Jones Assocs. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 280 (6th Cir. 1988). 
124. 858 F.2d at 279. 
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In 1990, however, Congress enacted the Architectural Works 
Copyright Protection Act, 125 which added "architectural works" to 
the list of "works of authorship" catalogued in section 102(a) of the 
Copyright Act.126 An "architectural work" is defined as "the de-
sign of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expres-
sion, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. "127 
Although the statute was designed in part to bring the United 
States into compliance with the Berne Convention,128 respectable 
authority suggested that the Berne Convention did not require a 
statutory provision for works of architecture.129 Moreover, the 
House Report accompanying the statute acknowledged that copy-
right legislation had to be consistent with the constitutional grant of 
power to "promote the progress of science"13o and concluded that 
"[p]rotection for works of architecture should stimulate excellence 
in design, thereby enriching our public environment in keeping with 
the constitutional goal. "131 
This attempt to reconcile architectural protection with the in-
centive justification for copyright is patent nonsense. Architects do 
not design buildings in the abstract; they work for clients with con-
crete objectives. If the architect does his job well, his client may 
provide him with more business or refer associates to him. If the 
building's. excellence attracts attention, the architect who designed 
it surely will attract more business. Copyright protection adds little 
to the incentives for excellence that already compel the architect.132 
Whatever other reasons support copyright protection for architec-
tural works,133 the need to provide appropriate incentives to archi-
tects is not one of them. 
125. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
02, 120 (1994)). 
126. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (1994). 
127. 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1994). 
128. See H.R. REP. No. 735, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20, 22 (1990). 
129. See H.R. REP. No. 735 at 11 & n.22 (referring to testimony by Paul Goldstein and 
Barbara Ringer). 
130. H.R. REP. No. 735 at 12. 
131. H.R. REP. No. 735 at 13. 
132. See generally Raphael Wmick, Copyright Protection for Architecture After the Archi· 
tectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 41 DuKE L. J. 1598, 1606-08 (1992) (catalog-
ing noncopyright incentives to architect creativity); James Bingham Bucher, Comment, 
Reinforcing the Foundation: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Works of Architecture, 
399 EMORY L.J. 1261, 1269 (1990) (same). 
Indeed, if copyright protection inhibits the copying of architecturally successful buildings, 
the principal result may be more employment for second-rate architects and more construc-
tion of second-rate buildings. 
133. See Natalie Wargo, Copyright Protection for Architecture and the Berne Convention, 
65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 403, 469-70 (1990). 
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III. COPYRIGHT AND THE DESERVING AUTHOR 
Copyright persists and expands despite the deficiencies in the 
incentive justification. To support copyright protection when the 
economic foundation is weak, courts, Congress, and scholars have 
invoked the notion that authors "deserve" the public benefit their 
creations generate, even if those authors would have created the 
same works without any promise of copyright monopoly. Indeed, a 
number of long-standing copyright doctrines are far more consis-
tent with a desert theory of copyright than with any incentive ra-
tionale. This section first surveys uses of the deserving-author 
justification in doctrine and then explores its normative 
underpinnings. 
A. The Deserving Author in Doctrine 
1. Exclusive Right To Prepare Derivative Works 
Consider first the author's exclusive right to prepare derivative 
works. As we have seen, extending this right to authors rarely 
would induce an author to produce an original work that the author 
would not otherwise produce.134 Giving authors an exclusive right 
over derivative works, however, is entirely consistent with the no-
tion that a work's creator deserves to share in all benefits generated 
by the work. 
Indeed, the deserving-author justification provides a coherent 
explanation for the Supreme Court's holding in Stewart v. Abend.135 
In Stewart, the author of a copyrighted story assigned the right to 
make a movie of the story, agreed that, at the appropriate time, he 
would renew the copyright in the story, and agreed to assign the 
movie rights for the renewal term. A production company headed 
by Stewart succeeded to the movie rights and made and copy-
righted the movie. When the author died before he was able to 
renew the copyright, his statutory successors renewe~ the copyright 
and assigned the renewal rights to Abend. Abend sued Stewart, 
contending that Stewart was infringing Abend's copyright in the 
original work by displaying the movie after expiration of the initial 
copyright period in the story. 'fhe Supreme Court agreed, holding 
that if an author of an original work dies during the original copy-
134. See supra section 11.B.2.b. 
135. 495 U.S. 207 (1990). I do not propose to enter the debate about the Court's process 
of statutory interpretation in Stewart. To the extent that the statute mandated the conclusion 
the Court reached, the statutory provision is understandable primarily by reference to a 
"deserving-author" rationale. 
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right period, the creator bf a copyrighted derivative work author-
ized by the original author may not use that work during the 
renewal period of the original work without the consent of the 
owner of the renewal period.136 
From an incentive perspective, the result in Stewart was per-
verse. No author would devote additional energy to writing on the 
hope that he might die before the end of the initial term, allowing 
statutory successors to terminate his grants of rights in derivative 
works. But potential creators of derivative works might well be re-
luctant to purchase rights to produce derivative works from an eld-
erly author toward the latter part of the initial copyright term if the 
author could not assure the purchaser of a continued right to dis-
play those derivative works during the renewal term. Yet Stewart 
- or the statute the Court construed - made it impossible for an 
author to give that assurance. 
On the other hand, from a "deserving-author" perspective, 
Stewart made considerable sense. In many cases, albeit not in 
Stewart itself, the spouse or children of the initial author would hold 
the renewal right.137 If the author initially had assigned his copy-
right before the work had reached the height of popularity, those 
family members might not have derived substantial benefit from 
the author's efforts. Especially if, as in Stewart, the original assign-
ment of the right to make the movie was given for a lump sum, with 
n.o provision for royalties, the renewal right might represent the 
only opportunity family members would have to capitalize on the 
author's work. 
2. Renewal and Termination Rights 
Both the renewal provisions in the 1909 Act138 and the termina-
tion provisions in the 1976 Act139 are most easily understood as 
mechanisms to provide for the deserving author and his family. 
The committee report accompanying the 1976 Act justified the ter-
mination provision by noting that "[a] provision of this sort is 
needed because of the unequal bargaining power of authors, result-
ing in part from the impossibility of determining a work's value un-
136. See 495 U.S. at 220-21. 
137. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 23·24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080·81 (amended 1976), 
which gave renewal rights to the author's widow, widower, or children if the author was not 
living at the time for renewal. 
In Stewart v. Abend, the author died without a surviving wife or child, so the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the court's holding were a charitable trust and its assignee. 
138. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 23-24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81 (amended 1976). 
139. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1994). 
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til it has been exploited."140 Proponents of the 1909 Act used 
similar language to justify the renewal period.141 
If, by "unequal bargafuing power" the drafters of the statute 
meant that publishers possess monopsony power that permits them 
to pay less than competitive prices to authors, the statutory cure -
termination rights - will do nothing to solve that problem. Pub-
lishers simply will use their monopsony power in some other way, 
for instance, by reducing the price they pay to authors for their 
work.142 . 
If, on the other hand, the "problem" Congress sought to address 
is the inability of publishers and authors to predict which works ul-
timately will prove successful, then Congress implicitly has decided 
that authors of successful works deserve greater compensation than 
authors of less successful works. The termination provision deals 
with the "problem" by guaranteeing future compensation to au-
thors of successful works. 
3. Limitations on "Work Made for Hire" 
American copyright law has long recognized an employer as the 
author of a work created by an employee within the scope of the 
employee's employment.143 Work-made-for-hire doctrine is largely 
consistent with the incentive justification for copyright: an em-
ployee working for a salary has adequate incentive to create with-
out giving the employee copyright protection; copyright protection 
gives employers an incentive to hire creative employees. 
In codifying work-made-for-hire doctrine, Congress made ter-
mination rights inapplicable to works made for hire.144 At the same 
time, Congress limited the right of parties to contract for work-
made-for-hire status; a commissioned work can qualify as a work 
made for hire only if the parties so agree and the commissioned 
140. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1976). 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88. 
142. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 102-03 (3d ed. 1986) (dis-
cussing the effect of monopoly on contract terms and concluding that "there is no reason to 
expect the terms ..• to be different .under monopoly from what they would be under compe-
tition; the only difference that is likely is that the monopolist's price will be higher"). 
143. Section 201(b) of the current statute provides: 
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work 
was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties 
have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the 
rights comprised in the copyright. 
17 u.s.c. § 20l(b) (1994). 
144. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1994). 
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work falls into specified statutory categories.145 If, for instance, a 
modern-day Charles Dickens were to contract with a serial pub-
lisher to write monthly installments of a novel for a fixed monthly 
price, the parties could not provide that Dickens's work would con-
stitute a work made for hire.146 
By limiting the power of parties to contract into work-made-for-
hire status, Congress made the same tradeoff it made when it cre-
ated inalienable termination rights: it reduced marginally the 
power of all authors to obtain remuneration now, while increasing 
the power of a class of successful authors to obtain remuneration 
when the time for termination arrives. The most plausible justifica-
tion for this tradeoff is a sense that successful authors deserve a 
second shot at compensation.147 
B. Implications of the Deserving-Author Model 
Suppose we take seriously the notion that intellectual property 
law is designed to protect "deserving" authors. Why are those au-
thors deserving of protection? In general terms, two noneconomic 
justifications for protecting authors have been advanced. The first 
- developed most extensively by Wendy Gordon - is based on 
the principle that one should not reap where another has sown.148 
The second, most prevalent in the literature on moral rights, is 
based on the notion that strong copyright protection is necessary to 
safeguard the personal autonomy of authors.149 This section con-
siders these justifications and explores their broader implications. 
145. Current § 101 defines a work made for hire as a work "prepared by an employee 
within the scope of his or her employment" or "a work specially ordered or commissioned for 
use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual 
work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as 
a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written 
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire." 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (1994). The statute then goes on to define supplementary work. 
146. Of course, if Dickens entered into an employment relationship and had income and 
social-security taxes withheld, he could qualify for work-made-for-hire status. See Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-53 (1989). 
147. The argument that work-made-for-hire limitations redress unequal bargaining power 
reduces to an argument that the market should be structured to permit authors to reap the 
compensation they deserve because of the value of their contributions. See Hamilton, supra 
note 90, at 1313-14, 1319 (arguing that further limitations on work made for hire, together 
with related reforms, are necessary to secure "fair remuneration" for authors). 
148. See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Resti-
tutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse]; 
see also Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Con-
sistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343 (1989) [hereinafter 
Gordon, Merits of Copyright]. 
149. See, e.g., Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the 
Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
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1. Of Reaping and Sowing 
The principle that a person should not reap where another has 
sown has great intuitive appeal. Like many desert-based principles, 
the reap-sow principle's intuitive appeal is undoubtedly due, in 
large measure, to its underlying economic wisdom: a society that 
wants to ensure that farmers sow had better protect the right of a 
farmer to reap what he has sown. To justify copyright doctrines 
that expand protection beyond what would be necessary to induce 
creative activity, however, the reap-sow principle must rest on a 
noneconomic foundation. In this section, I explore two bases for 
the principle, one based on corrective justice and the other based 
on distributive justice. 
a. The Inadequacy of the Corrective-Justice Justification 
Professor Gordon, using restitution law as an analog, suggests 
that the reap-sow principle rests on a model of corrective justice. 
She identifies three propositions to support her claim that authors 
are entitled to compensation from those who use their work: (1) a 
person has a right and privilege not to labor unless payment or sat-
isfactory inducement is forthcoming; (2) persons should have no af-
firmative right to the benefit of others' labor; and (3) persons who 
have labored are entitled to use the legal system to obtain payment 
from others for their use of the benefits the laborers have pro-
duced.150 Gordon's third proposition does not follow from the first 
two, and her corrective-justice rationale for intellectual property 
law falls with it. 
As Gordon recognizes, corrective justice "disregards the parties' 
overall moral worth or social contribution"151 and operates to rec-
tify gains and losses when "necessary to protect a distribution of 
holdings or entitlements from distortions."152 Gordon also ac-
knowledges that the law of restitution usually requires a plaintiff to 
show either a loss or the violation of a "legally protected inter-
est."153 These premises make it difficult to understand how 
corrective-justice principles in general or restitution law in particu-
lar can justify intellectual property rights, when the basic question is 
whether the author's social contribution merits reward or, put in 
legal terms, whether the author has a "legally protected interest" in 
150. See Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 148, at 181. 
151. Id. at 171. 
152. Id. (quoting Jules Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits, 1 J. L. 
& PHIL. 5, 6 (1983)). 
153. See Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 148, at 196-97. 
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creative works. If corrective-justice principles require restoration 
of legally protectible interests, there is an evident circularity in us-
ing those same principles to define legally protectible interests.154 
Gordon attempts to avoid this problem by emphasizing that in-
dividuals have "a privilege and a right not to labor"155 and can 
"trade on this entitlement package to obtain compensation via con-
tract."156 She concedes difficulty in jumping from that proposition 
to the conclusion that persons have a right to be paid for the results 
of their labor without contract.157 Ultimately, the only argument 
she musters is one that rests not on the moral claim of the "creator" 
of intellectual work but on the absence of any claim by the work's 
user that the 'user would be wronged if required to pay for the 
work.158 This argument goes nowhere. As Gordon herself recog-
nizes, we all constantly derive benefits from the labors of others 
without incurring any moral obligation to pay for those benefits.159 
Gordon never explains why the user of intellectual work has any 
greater moral obligation to pay for that work than the Delaware 
state lottery has to pay the National Football League (NFL) for 
profits it derives from a lottery keyed to the results in NFL football 
games.160 
After attempting to derive a reap-sow justification for intellec-
tual property rights from abstract moral principle, Gordon turns to 
the positive law of restitution. There, on more than one occasion, 
she draws an analogy to the obligation of a patient to compensate a 
physician who has given the patient emergency treatment while the 
154. Cf. Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & Pun. AFF. 31, 38 
(1989) ("Markets work only after property rights have been established and enforced, and 
our question is what sorts of property rights an inventor, writer, or manager should have 
.... "). 
155. Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 148, at 181-82. 
156. Id. 
157. See id. 
158. See id. at 185-86. She writes: "There is no reason to give users a baseline entitle-
ment to whatever they could have obtained in a world without legal protection for intellec-
tual products." Id. at 186. Other versions of the same argument appear in her earlier work, 
Gordon, Merits of Copyright, supra note 148, at 1454-60, and her more recent work, Wendy J. 
Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law 
of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1549 (1993) [hereinafter Gordon, A Property 
Right in Self-Expression]. 
159. See Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 148, at 167 ("A culture could not 
exist if all free riding were prohibited within it. Every person's education involves a form of 
free riding on his predecessors' efforts, as does every form of scholarship and scientific 
progress."). 
160. See National Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977) 
(holding that the lottery was entitled to make references to NFL games), quoted in Gordon, 
Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 148, at 168 n.68. 
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patient was unconscious.161 But an examination of the leading res-
titution treatise - liberally cited by Professor Gordon - reveals 
that the patient's obligation to the physician represents a narrow 
exception to the general rule that denies restitutionary relief to a 
person who has provided unsolicited benefits to another.162 
Moreover, there are sound economic reasons for the rule per-
mitting the physician to recover for services rendered to the uncon-
scious patient. First, the physician had every reason to assume that 
the patient would want him to bypass the market in providing treat-
ment; the unconscious patient was in no position to enter into an 
express contract, and nearly anyone would be willing to pay a rea-
sonable doctor's fee for treatment when unconscious. Neither of 
these conditions applies in the intellectual property context. Mar-
ket transactions are possible, and it is far from clear that everyone 
willing to use a free intellectual work would be willing to pay for 
that work.163 Second, there are obvious policy reasons to provide 
physicians with an economic incentive to treat unconscious patients. 
While both of these reasons support allowing the physician to re-
cover from the patient, neither of them provides a corrective-justice 
rationale for recovery. 
My point here is not to attack Professor Gordon's conclusions; 
indeed, after developing her restitutionary model for intellectual 
property rights, her enterprise has been to show that the model sup-
ports only a narrow range of intellectual property rights.164 Rather, 
my point is to demonstrate that even when a distinguished and en-
ergetic scholar seeks to place intellectual property rights on a 
161. See Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 148, at 188, 197. 
162. Compare 2 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF REsrrnmoN §§ 10.2-10.3 (stating 
that restitution generally is not available for unsolicited payment of another's debts or for 
unsolicited expenditures to protect another's property) with § 10.4 (stating that restitution 
may be available for intervention to protect life and health). Palmer writes: "Courts have 
placed a higher value on protection of these interests [protection of life or health] than they 
have on protection of property, as a comparison with the preceding section will demon-
strate." Id. § 10.4, at 376. 
Indeed, Professor Gordon herself speaks of the "rule that volunteers are not entitled to 
payment" and seeks to argue that copyright falls into one of the exceptions to that rule. 
Gordon, Merits of Copyright, supra note 148, at 1456. 
163. Gordon acknowledges these points explicitly. Thus, she notes that the creator of 
intellectual work could release his work to a user on the condition that any resale by the user 
would involve royalty payments to the creator, and she also acknowledges that "[i]n the real 
world, it may be impossible to know whether a given work ... would have been sold with a 
royalty promise attached." Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 148, at 184. 
164. See Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression, supra note 158, at 1607 {indicating 
that her goal is "to help prune back the overweening growth in natural law rhetoric that has 
prompted many ill-conceived intellectual property decisions over the last two decades"). 
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corrective-justice foundation, the effort fails. If intellectual prop-
erty rights are to be justified, the justification must lie elsewhere. 
b. Copyright and Distributive Justice 
Unlike corrective-justice claims, which ignore the moral worth 
and social contributions of competing parties, the distributive-
justice claim for intellectual property protection rests on the prem-
ise that authors, artists, and other creators have, by virtue of their 
contributions, an entitlement to the benefits associated with those 
contributions. Most distributive-justice arguments for intellectual 
property rights trace their origin to Lockean labor theory.165 
Locke's labor theory today might be called an equality-of-
opportunity theory about the acquisition of property rights. Locke 
started with the premise that each individual has a property interest 
in his own person and the labor of his own body.166 He then as-
serted that whenever an individual joins his labor with a resource 
that previously belonged to mankind in common, the individual la-
borer acquires a private property right in that resource, at least so 
long as "enough, and as good" of the resource is left for other po-
tential laborers.167 In Locke's words: 
God gave the World to Men in Common; but since he gave it them for 
their benefit, and the greatest Conveniences of Life they were c,apable 
to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always re-
main common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the Industri-
ous and Rational, and Labour was to be his Title to it; not to the 
Fancy or Covetousness of the Quarrelsome and Contentious. He that 
had as good left for his own Improvement, as was already taken up, 
needed not complain, and ought not to meddle with what was already 
improved by another's Labour: If he did, 'tis plain he desired the ben-
efit of another's pains, which he.had no right to .... 168 
That is, so long as each individual has an equal opportunity to ex-
ploit undifferentiated common resources, those who capitalize on 
the opportunity are entitled to resist claims by those who do not. 
165. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 54, at 296-329 (deriving Lockean justification for intel-
lectual property rights); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and 
Possession, 51 Omo ST. LJ. 517, 546-47 (1990) (tracing the impact of Lockean philosophy on 
copyright law). 
Professor Gordon also suggests that an author's labors give the author rights superior to 
consumers generally, see Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 148, at 186, and that 
Locke's labor theory might be helpful in understanding intellectual property rights, see id. at 
208-09, although she prefers not to cast her claim as one rooted in Locke, see id. at 167. 
166. See JoHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT para. 27 (Peter Lasslet ed., 
1963) (1698). 
167. See para. 27; see also id. paras. 28, 33, 34. 
168. Id. para. 34 (emphasis added). 
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Locke's emphasis on labor as the foundation of property rights 
has made his work especially attractive to intellectual property the-
orists. After all, unlike the farmer or the industrialist, who must 
combine labor with liberal doses of land or capital to create some-
thing of value, the author or artist draws only on inexhaustible re-
sources - the wealth of human experience - to create works of 
value. Thus, the author, more than most property claimants, ap-
pears quite likely to satisfy the Lockean "proviso": after the author 
uses common resources, "there is enough, and as good left in com-
mon for others."169 
But why should a person hold property rights in his own labor, 
and why should adding that labor to common resources give the 
laborer a property right in the common resources? The notion that 
a person is entitled to his labor and thus merits compensation from 
those who would use it has great intuitive appeal but also serves an 
important economic function: it encourages people to work in a 
way that they might not if labor were treated as part of a common 
pool of societal resources.17° If increased labor generates increased 
social welfare, rules that encourage work have positive social conse-
quences. Moreover, by giving a person who labors not only the 
right to profit from that labor but also a right to common resources 
with which he "mixes" his labor, Lockean theory provides yet 
greater incentive to work and simultaneously encourages privatiza-
tion of resources, thus avoiding the "tragedy of the commons."171 
As Locke himself recognized, if individuals could.not privatize com-
mon resources without the consent of all mankind, "man might 
have starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him."172 
169. Id. para. 27. 
Indeed, as often emphasized in judicial pronouncements, if a second author uses the same 
background material to create a work similar or identical to that created by a prior author, 
there is no infringement so long as there was no copying of the first author's work. See, e.g., 
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, J.) (noting 
that "if by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on 
a Grecian Um, he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that 
poem, though they might of course copy Keats's"). 
By contrast, once an inventor patents a work, a subsequent inventor is precluded from 
using or marketing an identical work even if the subsequent inventor was entirely unaware of 
the prior invention. Yet, given the opportunities for invention in the society and the pace of 
technological advance, it would be nearly impossible to argue that the grant of one patent 
reduced the opportunity for other inventors to invent. 
170. Cf. Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REv. 383, 
425 (1993) (noting that giving creditors claims against earning capacity might cause the 
debtor to substitute leisure for work). 
171. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
172. LocKE, supra note 166, para. 28. Richard Epstein makes a similar point in arguing 
that Lockean theory has a consequentialist cast: 
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My goal here is not to portray Locke as the ultimate consequen-
tialist but to observe that, like many natural-rights theories, Locke's 
labor theory is appealing, at least in part, because it generates at-
tractive consequences.173 The question then becomes whether 
Lockean theory would be so compelling were it not for the eco-
nomic advantages a Lockean regime generates. The question is im-
portant in the intellectual property context because giving authors 
property rights in their creations does not generate the economic 
advantages generally associated with Lockean theory. 
First, as we already have seen, many intellectual property rules 
and especially many of those most recently adopted do not create 
any significant incentive to engage in creative activity.174 Second, 
unlike land, intellectual property offers no potential for a tragedy of 
the commons. Orice created, intellectual property is a public good, 
capable of enjoyment by millions without incurring significant extra 
costs. No efficiency justification requires privatizing intellectual 
property. Hence, if Lockean labor theory supports a regime of in-
tellectual property rights, it must do so without the added ballast 
that efficiency arguments generally lend to Lockean natural rights. 
Stripped of its consequentialist underpinnings, the principal at-
traction of Lockean labor theory is its emphasis on respect for per-
sonal autonomy, affording each person an equal opportunity to 
pursue his own vision of the good life. For Locke, when a person 
acquires a resource from the common pool by adding his labor to it, 
others have no claim to the resource so long as enough similar re-
sources are available for them to develop through the use of their 
own labor. As Locke put it, "he that leaves as much as another can 
make use of does as good as take nothing at all."175 
Equal labor, however, does not generate equal results. All men 
are not created equal in talent, and all men are not, therefore, 
equally positioned to develop common resources to their best ad-
vantage. Some farmers, because of greater physical strength or 
There will be bargaining breakdown if the consent of all individuals is necessary for 
the consumption of any portion of the whole. . . . Now the ultimate justification for 
Locke is no longer desert theory, but simple necessity. . . . Consent is not required to 
establish property rights because the number of parties is too great for it to work. When 
necessity, not consent, becomes the origin of property, then we have a utilitarian system, 
not a social contract theory. 
Richard Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HARv. J.L. & Pua. POLY. 
713, 733-34 (1989). 
173. See generally Epstein, supra note 172 (arguing that many natural-law theories are 
congruent with consequentialist arguments). 
174. See supra text accompanying notes 71-133. 
175. LoCKE, supra note 166, para. 33. Professor Gordon appears to endorse the same 
view. See Gordon, Merits of Copyright, supra note 148, at 1446 (quoting John Stuart Mill). 
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greater intelligence, will reap a better harvest from the same land 
even if they expend no more effort than their weaker or duller 
neighbors. The same is true - to an even greater degree - with 
intellectual works: all may have the same opportunity to use the 
existing world as background for a creative work, but only some 
have the talent necessary to capitalize on that background material. 
In a world where differences in talent appear far more critical 
than they did in Locke's hypothesized world of acorn gatherers, 
farmers, and :fishermen, why should those with greater talent be en-
titled to greater reward? John Rawls explicitly rejects the Lockean 
notion that each person is entitled to the fruits of his own labor, 
arguing instead that the talented do not deserve to be rewarded for 
their talents.176 To Rawls, the distribution of talents is arbitrary 
from a moral point of view and should not furnish a basis for the 
distribution of social resources.177 Rawls acknowledges that natural 
talents should earn premiums, but those premiums "are to cover 
the costs of training and to encourage the efforts of learning, as well 
as to direct ability to where it best serves the common interest."178 
That is, for Rawls, rewarding talent is justified only on instrumental 
grounds, not because the person who holds and uses talent deserves 
reward.179 Rawls's "difference principle" would permit return to 
those endowed with talent only to the extent that rewarding the 
talented would improve the lot of the le~st fortunate.180 In a 
Rawlsian scheme, then, desert provides no justification for copy-
right protection; only the need to provide economic incentives 
would support rewarding those with creative abilities. 
Suppose, however, one were to believe that people do deserve 
to benefit from their talents, perhaps as a reward for the efforts 
they have made to develop whatever natural abilities they might 
have.181 There remains no reason to assume that the benefits a tal-
176. See JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 102 {1971) {"No one deserves his greater 
natural capacity ••.. ); id. at 311 ("[T]he initial endowment of natural assets and the contin-
gencies of their growth and nurture in early life are arbitrary from a moral point of view."). 
177. See id. at 311-12. 
178. See id. 
179. Rawls acknowledges the intuitive appeal of a distribution according to effort but 
rejects a moral claim based on effort, arguing that "[t]he better endowed are more likely, 
other things equal, to strive conscientiously, and there seems to be no way to discount from 
their greater good fortune." Id. at 312. 
180. See id. at 78-79. 
181. Rawls attacks this position by suggesting that the inclination to develop natural tal-
ents itself may be an inborn ability distributed among people in a morally arbitrary fashion. 
He notes that "[t]he better endowed are more likely, other things equal, to strive conscien-
tiously," id. at 312, and that "[t]he extent to which natural capacities develop and reach frui-
tion is affected by all kinds of social conditions and class attitudes," id. at 74. 
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ented person deserves should in any way be tied to the market 
power associated with copyright protection. As Freidrich Hayek 
has observed, market prices have little to do with merit or desert: 
"Their function is not so much to reward people for what they have 
done as to tell them what in their own as well as in general interest 
they ought to do."182 Unforeseeable changes in market conditions 
easily can make one market participant rich and another poor even 
though the ideas they develop may be quite similar.183 Moreover, if 
our goal is to reward "deserving" creators, a variety of alternatives 
are available, including prizes, grants, honors, and awards.184 De-
sert, then, provides little basis for property-right protection for au-
thors or for other protection tied to market forces.18s 
Suppose, however, one believes that a person with natural tal-
ents is entitled to benefit from them even if the talents themselves 
are undeserved. Consider Robert Nozick's vigorous attack on 
Rawls's formula for redistribution of resources.186 Nozick does not 
disagree with Rawls's assertion that the distribution of natural as-
sets is morally arbitrary and that the holder of natural assets does 
not "deserve" to profit from them. Instead, Nozick argues that de-
sert is irrelevant, that "[w]hether or not people's natural assets are 
arbitrary from a moral point of view, they are entitled to them, and 
to what flows from them."187 Nozick's argument, however, lends 
little ammunition to proponents of a desert-based copyright law. 
For a critique of Rawls's position and an argument that differences in ability to make 
efforts have little moral significance, see George Sher, Effort, Ability, and Personal Desert, 8 
PHIL & PUB. AFF. 361, 364-70 (1979). 
182. 2 F.A. HAYEK, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 71-72 (1976). 
Moreover, one might argue that all intellectual products are inevitably the result of many 
people's talents, over a long period of time, and that no one author has a natural right to the 
market value of those products. See Hettinger, supra note 154, at 39. 
183. See Russell Hardin, Valuing Intellectual Property, 68 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 659, 667-69 
(1993) (noting that IBM's decision to use Bill Gates's operating system made Gates a multi-
billionaire and noting that Gates's wealth rested as much on IBM's need to have a single 
operating system as on the particular merits of Gates's system); Jeremy Waldron, From Au-
thors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 Cm.-KENT L. 
REv. 841, 856 (1993) (noting that readiness to pay for a new song may have little to do with 
the merits of the songwriter but with factors such as "how many other catchy tunes there are 
on the market this week, whether the state of the world fosters a general desire to be cheered 
up, and so on"). 
184. See Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 Cm.-KENT L. 
REv. 609, 622 (1993); Breyer, supra note 42, at 287; Hettinger, supra note 154, at 41. But cf. 
Hamilton, Art Speech, supra note 98 (emphasizing the failures of government funding for the 
arts). 
185. Wendy Gordon, for instance, argues that her restitutionary principles lead not to 
property rights but to claims for compensation by authors. Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, 
supra note 148, at 192-93. 
186. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 183-228 (1974). 
187. Id. at 226. 
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Nozick starts with the premise that so long as a person's hold-
ings were generated properly, the state should not intervene to re-
distribute those holdings to accord with any social notions of need 
or desert.188 Instead, all redistribution should occur by voluntary 
transfer, with or without consideration, without regard to the trans-
feror's reasons for making the transfer.189 To the extent that one of 
Nozick's primary objectives is minimizing state interference with 
private transfers, Nozick's theory is not helpful to advocates of 
broad intellectual property rights because a strong intellectual 
property regime requires state intervention to inhibit private volun-
tary transfers. Nozick himself notes disagreement within the liber-
tarian community about the merits of copyright protection.190 
Thus, for those who believe in the distribution of social wealth 
according to moral principle, copyright is problematic because the 
talents people are born with appear morally arbitrary. For those 
who believe the state should not intervene to redistribute the pro-
ceeds of natural talents, copyright is problematic because authors 
cannot rely exclusively on voluntary transfers to derive a return on 
their talents. The notion that authors "deserve" copyright protec-
tion, then, rests on shaky foundations. 
2. Copyright and Personal Identity 
a. Personal Identity as a Justification for Broad 
Copyright Protection 
Running through the copyright literature is yet another justifica-
tion for protecting authors: creative people define themselves by 
reference to their work, and giving them control over their work is 
essential in order to protect their self-conceptions.191 Intellectual 
property rights are designed not so much to provide financial re-
wards as to allow the author to maintain a sense of identity. 
188. See id. at 230 ("If the set of holdings is properly generated, there is no argument for 
a more extensive state based upon distributive justice.") Nozick rejects all "patterned" prin-
ciples of justice, by which he means principles such as "to each according to his __ ." Id. 
at 159-60. 
189. See id. at 158-60. 
190. See id. at 141. 
191. See Becker, supra note 184, at 610; Damich, supra note 149, at 25-40; Hughes, supra 
note 54, at 331-50; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: 
A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 10 IND. L.J. 47, 60 (1994); Neil Netanel, Alienability 
Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental 
Copyright Law, 12 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. LJ. 1, 13-23 (1994); Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread 
and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1532, 1541-42. 
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The notion that intellectual property rights are essential to pro-
tect personal identity is often traced to Hegel.192 For Hegel, prop-
erty is the means by which personality is objectified.193 Property 
forms a medium through which a person obtains recognition by 
others.194 To Hegel, the abstract person is exactly that, abstract. 
He has no distinguishing characteristics and cannot, therefore, be 
recognized by others. That is, property transforms abstract individ-
uals into persons with distinguishing individual characteristics.195 
The person must acquire external effects, including talents and 
other personality traits, in order to become recognizable. Acquisi-
tion of property enables each of us to relate to others in a way we 
otherwise could not.196 
One's work is among the many types of objects a person can use 
to obtain recognition from others.197 If, however, the work were 
192. Less often, a similar justification is attributed to Kant. See Netanel, supra note 191, 
at 17-23. 
193. HEGEL, PHiwsoPHY OF RIGHT para. 51 (T.M. Knox trans. Oxford University Press 
1967) (1952). 
194. Hence, Hegel insists that to obtain a property right, a person must take "occupancy" 
so that "[t]he embodiment which my willing thereby attains involves its recognizability by 
others." Id. 
195. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret Radin's Imagery of Personal 
Property as the Inviolate Feminine Body, 19 MINN. L. REV. 55, 133-34 (1994); see also 
Hughes, supra note 54, at 343 ("Hegel argues that recognizing an individual's property rights 
is an act of recognizing the individual as a person."). 
196. Thus, Hegel notes that 
[a] person by distinguishing himself from himself relates himself to another person, and 
it is only as owners that these two persons really exist for each other. Their implicit 
identity is realized through the transference of property from one to the other in con-
formity with a common will and without detriment to the rights of either. 
HEGEL, supra note 193, para. 40. Jeanne Schroeder notes that "the Hegelian concept of the 
person is always already implicitly driven by the erotic desire to be desired" and that "[t]he 
individual cannot exist except through concrete relationships with other individuals." 
Schroeder, supra note 195, at 136. Property fosters those concrete relationships. See id. at 
110-12 (showing how a market community fosters personal interrelationships between indi-
viduals who may appear to have little in common). 
197. Hegel recognized that some might be uncomfortable treating the talents and skills as 
property because they appeared to be an essential part of the individual rather than.an object 
acquired through mediation of the will. He explained: 
We may hesitate to call ... abilities, attainments, aptitudes &c., "things," for while pos-
session of these may be the subject of business dealings and contracts, as if they were 
things, there is also something inward and mental about it, and for this reason the Un-
derstanding may be in perplexity about how to describe such possession in legal terms 
• . • • Attainments, erudition, talents, and so forth, are, of course, owned by free mind 
and are something internal and not external to it, but even so, by expressing them it may 
embody them in something external and alienate them ... and in this way they are put 
into the category of "things." Therefore they are not immediate at the start but only 
acquire this character through the mediation of mind which reduces its inner possessions 
to immediacy and externality. 
HEGEL, supra note 193, para. 43. 
Hegel concluded that only a small class of objects that, once appropriated, become an 
inherent part of the individual personality, are, unlike ordinary property rights, inalienable. 
See id. para. 66 ("Substantive characteristics which constitute my own private personality and 
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treated as a public good, recognition would be one-sided; the crea-
tor, like the donor of a gift, would be recognized by admirers of the 
work but would have no opportunity to recognize the admirers. For 
the creator, the admirers would be only means to his own end: re-
cognition.19s By contrast, treating creative work as property sus-
ceptible to exchange opens up the possibility of mutual recogllition; 
creator and admirers must treat each other as subjects with their 
own independent wills.199 
Within the Hegelian scheme, property rights are more impor-
tant for their existence than for their substantive content. Because 
property is about relations, not about objects, the precise contours 
of legal doctrine are unimportant so long as property law enables 
people to engage in intersubjective relations. Iiltellectual property 
rights, although entirely consistent with Hegel's conception of prop-
erty, are not strictly necessary. Perforce, intellectual property rights 
need not have any particular content or form. Indeed, after raising 
questions about the boundaries of plagiarism, Hegel wrote: "There 
is no precise principle of determination available to answer these 
questions, and therefore they cannot be finally settled either in 
principle or by positive legislation."200 Hegel's statement is consis-
tent with his more general belief "that philosophy could not give 
definitive answers to practical questions of positive law."201 Thus, it 
would be wrong to invoke Hegel to support, say, a longer copyright 
period or protection for derivative works. In fact, without endors-
ing any particular positive law rules, Hegel evinced a keen aware-
ness that overbroad intellectual property protection would inhibit 
the ability of future creators to build on the works of their prede-
the universal essence of my self-consciousness are inalienable and my right to them is 
imprescriptible. ") 
198. See Schroeder, supra note 195, at 139 (discussing the superiority of exchange over 
gift as a means of alienation) ("In exchange ... I am not only a giver but also a recipient who 
simultaneously recognizes the other's objectification in and indifference to the object I re-
ceive. In other words, I see her as someone who has her own ends rather than merely as a 
means to my ends."). 
199. 
Contract recognizes a moment in which two persons are united in that they are bound 
together in a common will at the same time that they recognize each other as separate 
individuals having specific rights and duties. Because we share a common will (i.e., the 
intent to exchange objects), we can simultaneously serve each others' ends without being 
reduced to the mere means to each others' ends. 
Id. 
200. HEGEL, supra note 193, para. 69. Hegel went on to conclude that "plagiarism would 
have to be a matter of honour and be held in check by honour." Id. para. 69, at 56. 
201. Schroeder, supra note 195, at 131 n.287. 
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cessors.202 Moreover, given property's role in filling out the indi-
vidual personality, it would be particularly difficult to argue from 
Hegel that copyright protection should extend beyond the author's 
death.203 
b. Personal Identity and Moral Rights 
Hegel is most frequently invoked to support protection for 
moral rights - particularly the right to be identified as author and 
the right to prevent unapproved changes of copyrighted works.204 
The argument runs that Hegel's insistence that an individual may 
not alienate elements of his own personality205 requires that an au-
thor control his own work even after giving up ordinary copyright 
protection. According to Joseph Kohler: 
[T]he writer can not only demand that no strange work be presented 
as his, but that his own work not be presented in a changed form. The 
author can make this demand even when he has given up his copy-
right. This demand is not so much an exercise of dominion over my 
own work, as it is of dominion over my being, over my personality 
which thus gives me the right to demand that no one shall share in my 
personality and have me say things which I have not said. 206 
If the concern is about harm to an author's reputation as a result of 
false attribution of words or artworks, contemporary defamation 
law provides an adequate remedy for the injured author, as for 
202. 
[T]he purpose of a product of mind is that people other than its author should under-
stand it and make it the possession of their ideas, memory, thinking, &c. .•• The result is 
that they may regard as their own property the capital asset accruing from their learning 
and may claim for themselves the right to reproduce their learning in books of their own. 
HEGEL, supra note 193, para. 69; see also id. para. 68: 
In the case of works of art, the form - the portrayal of thought in an external medium 
- is, regarded as a thing, so peculiarly the property of the individual artist that a copy of 
a work of art is essentially a product of the copyist's own mental and technical ability. 
203. Except, of course, that Hegel, too, recognized an instrumental justification for intel-
lectual property rights: 
The purely negative, though the primary, means of advancing the sciences and arts is to 
guarantee scientists and artists against theft and to enable them to benefit from the pro-
tection of their property, just as it was the primary and most important means of advanc-
ing trade and industry to guarantee it against highway robbery. 
Id. para. 69. 
204. See, e.g., Damich, supra note 149, at 28 n.135; Hughes, supra note 54, at 350; 
Netanel, supra note 191, at 21-23. 
205. See HEGEL, supra note 193, para. 66 ("[T]hose goods, or rather substantive charac-
teristics, which constitute my own private personality, and the universal essence of my self-
consciousness are inalienable. . . . Such characteristics are my personality as such, my univer-
sal freedom of will, my ethical life, my religion."). 
206. Arthur S. Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and American Copyright Law - A 
Proposa~ 24 S. CAL L. REV. 375, 402 (1951) (emphasis in original) (quoting JOSEPH 
KOHi.ER, URHEBERRECHT AN SCHRIFTWERKEN UND VERLAGSRECHT 15 (1907)); see also 
Damich, supra note 149, at 29; Netanel, supra note 191, at 21-23. 
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others injured in their professions by false representations.201 
When reputation is not at stake, however, Hegel's Philosophy of 
Right furnishes only limited support for the notion that personal 
dignity requires giving an author permanent control over the 
destiny of his work. · 
In asserting that "those goods, or rather substantive characteris-
tics which constitute my own private personality and the universal 
essence of my self consciousness are inalienable," Hegel listed such 
characteristics as "my personality as such, my universal freedom of 
will, my ethical life, my religion."2os Because, for Hegel, property 
serves as a mediator between persons, property presupposes some 
definition of the person as a recognizable subject. In defining some 
characteristics as inalienable, Hegel was, in Jeanne Schroeder's 
words, "in effect asking what absolute minimum objects a subject 
must retain to remain recognizable as a specific individual by other 
subjects and called these minimum objects 'personality.' "209 By 
definition, a person who surrenders the right to hold beliefs or to 
make any future decisions has ceased functioning as a recognizable 
person and has become instead an object - the property of an-
other person.210 
At the same time, Hegel explicitly acknowledged the power of a 
person to alienate his labor for a time-limited period and to alienate 
products of his physical and mental skfil.211 Indeed, without power 
to alienate labor or the products of physical and mental skills, a 
person's opportunities to exercise his will and to relate to others 
would be reduced significantly. Thus, Hegel's restraints on aliena-
tion are narrowly limited: only if I alienate "the whole of my time, 
as crystallized in my work, and everything I produced" would I be 
"making into another's property the substance of my being, my uni-
versal activity and actuality, my personality."212 Hegel's concern 
was with the person who would sell himself into slavery and cease 
functioning as a person, not with the artist or author who sells a 
completed work of art only to see it transformed or destroyed. 
207. See generally w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS 790-91 (5th ed. 1984). 
208. HEGEL, supra note 193, para. 66, at 52-53. 
209. Schroeder, supra note 195, at 144. 
210. See id. at 143 (noting that Hegel's inalienability of personality is merely a defini-
tional matter) ("If the minimum definition of the person is the free will, one must not alien-
ate one's capacity for freedom."). 
211. See HEGEL, supra note 193, para. 67. 
212. Id. 
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Beyond Hegel, it remains difficult to understand why the iden-
tity of artists and authors should be more bound up with their work 
than the identity of others who enjoy no protection against altera-
tion of their work. Jamie Boyle has noted the anomaly that under-
lies moral-rights claims by asking "Could we imagine giving a 
plumber a control over the pipes she installs even after the work is 
paid for, or a cabinetmaker the right to veto the conversion of her 
writing desk into a television cabinet?"213 It may be appropriate to 
give copyright protection to the author and not to the cabinetmaker 
because the author's work and not the cabinetmaker's has the char-
acteristics of a public good that would be underproduced without 
the copyright monopoly.214 That distinction, however, has nothing 
to do with the supposed identification between craftsman and craft. 
IV. ALTERNATE EXPLANATIONS FOR EXPANSIVE 
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
A. Copyright and Interest-Group Politics 
If the most frequently proffered justifications for expansive and 
expanded copyright protection are unsatisfying, does copyright leg-
islation merely reflect the political power of the copyright indus-
tries? Indeed, much in the history of twentieth-century copyright 
legislation suggests that those industries have used political muscle 
to expand protection at public expense. 
Public choice theory suggests that legislation will be more likely 
to reflect the. interests of small but organized groups than the inter-
ests of the public at large.21s The history of copyright legislation 
certainly supports that thesis. The 1909 statute, for instance, devel-
oped out of a series of conferences convened by the Librarian of 
213. James Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM. U. L. 
REv. 625, 629 (1988). 
214. See supra section II.A. 
215. The problem identified by public choice theorists is that creation of an effective lob-
bying force requires collective action, and individuals who contribute to the collective enter-
prise confer external benefits on beneficiaries who do not contribute. Thus, in responding to 
pluralists who argued that appeasement of a variety of small groups achieved the ends of 
democracy, Mancur Olson noted that members of large groups have little incentive to organ-
ize effectively so long as the benefits to be secured by group action would be collective bene-
fits. MANcUR OLSON, THE Lome OF CoLLECI1VE ACTION 125-28 (1971). In Olson's words: 
It follows that the analytical pluralists, the "group theorists," have built their theory 
around an inconsistency. They have assumed that, if a group had some reason or incen-
tive to organize to further its interest, the rational individuals in that group would also 
have a reason or an incentive to support an organization working in their mutual inter-
est But this is logically fallacious, at least for large, latent groups with economic 
interests. 
Id. at 127; see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CON· 
SENT. LoGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONS11TU1lONAL D EMOCRACY 283-95 (1962). 
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Congress. Invited to the conference were representatives of inter-
est groups protected by existing copyright legislation. When the 
draft bills generated out of these conferences ran into opposition 
from other interest groups, not represented at the conferences, the 
problems were resolved by negotiations among representatives of 
the various groups. Congress promptly enacted the compromise 
bill.216 
In the period leading to the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress made 
it clear that industry representatives would have to hammer out a 
bill acceptable to all interest groups.217 A new statute could only 
advantage all interest groups if it expanded the scope of copyright 
protection - at the expense of the public domain - and that is 
precisely what the 1976 statute did. 
Jessica Litman, in her examination of the legislative history ac-
companying the statute, summarized the statute's evolution: "The 
bill that emerged from the conferences enlarged the copyright pie 
and divided its pieces among conference participants so that no 
leftovers remained."218 In an article designed not to critique the 
statute itself but rather to criticize courts for ignoring the deals 
struck by participants in the drafting process,219 Litman highlighted 
the compromises made to ensure that each interest group was at 
least as well off as it was under the preceding statute. Authors se-
cured a number of substantial advantages: copyright attached upon 
fixation rather than publication; copyright duration was extended 
dramatically and without any need to renew; the work-made-for-
hire doctrine was significantly reduced in scope; and authors ob-
tained an inalienable right to terminate copyright grants they previ-
ously had made.220 The new rights obtained by authors, however, 
did not come at the expense of publishers or other assignees. To 
accommodate the interests of publishers and studios, parties, by 
agreement, could treat works commissioned for use in a collective 
work or for use "as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual 
work" as works made for hire.221 Authors were entitled to exercise 
216. For a more detailed history of the 1909 legislation, see Jessica D. Litman, Copyright 
Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REv. 275, 283-88 (1989). 
217. For extensive discussion of the process, see Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compro-
mise, and Legislative History, 72 CoR."IELL L. REv. 857, 870-79 (1987) [hereinafter Litman, 
Copyright, Compromise]; and Litman, supra note 216, at 306-42. 
218. Litman, supra note 216, at 317. 
219. See Litman, Copyright, Compromise, supra note 217, at 903. 
220. See id. at 890-93. 
221. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994); Litman, Copyright, Compromise, supra note 217, at 890-
91. 
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termination rights only during a "window period"; if they failed to 
do so, assignees would derive the full benefit of the extended copy-
right period.222 Moreover, a licensee who had produced a deriva-
tive work before termination would be entitled to use it after 
termination; by comparison, under the old statute, a licensee often 
could not ensure continued copyright protection of the derivative 
work once the initial copyright period on the original work had 
expired.223 
The drafters' technique, Litman notes, was to confer copyright 
protection in expansive terms and then to provide exceptions to ap-
pease parties with significant bargaining power.224 Her discussion 
of performance rights illustrates the point. Section 106( 4) of the 
statute gives copyright holders the exclusive right to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly, without any of the "for-profit" limita-
tions that had existed in pre-1976 law.2zs Section 110 then cata-
logues a variety of exceptions included to obtain the support of 
interest groups concerned about the effect an expansive perform-
ance right would have on their own operations.226 
It is hardly shocking to discover that interest-group power has 
shaped copyright legislation. Indeed, it would be astonishing if in-
terest groups were not involved. Similarly, it is not surprising that 
the rhetoric advanced in support of statutory reform emphasized 
the public interest rather than the private interests that the new 
statute actually was designed to promote. What is surprising is the 
paucity of criticism - from Congress, public interest groups, and 
the academic community - that has accompanied each new expan-
sion of copyright protections.227 The next subsection advances a 
tentative theory to explain the general support copyright protection 
has enjoyed. 
222. See Litman, Copyright, Compromise, supra note 217, at 892-93. 
223. See id. at 893; compare Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990) (applying old law and 
holding that the right to use derivative work expired with the initial term of the copyright on 
the original work). 
224. See Litman, Copyright, Compromise, supra note 217, at 893-94. 
225. See id. at 884. 
226. See id. at 885. 
227. In recent years, of course, a number of distinguished commentators have recognized 
the need to limit copyright protection and have sought to show how their own theories of 
copyright are consistent with doctrinal limitations. See e.g., Gordon, Merits of Copyright, 
supra note 148; Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 148; Yen, supra note 165. 
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B. Copyright Rhetoric and Self-Justification of the 
Lawmaker Class 
1247 
One explanation for the general failure to question copyright 
rhetoric is that participants in the lawmaking process - not only 
legislators and judges, but also lawyers, opinionmakers, and persons 
with wealth and political influence - have a self-interest in wide-
spread acceptance of the proposition that authors deserve to bene-
fit from their work. Rejecting the argument that authors deserve 
returns from their labors also would undermine the claim that pros-
perous members of society deserve their prosperity. 
Friedrich Hayek has attributed the self-esteem and even self-
righteousness of many businessmen to the belief - fostered by 
popular American writers - that free enterprise regularly rewards 
the deserving.228 It is nice to be prosperous, but it is even nicer to 
believe that our prosperity is deserved.229 Beyond increasing our 
self-esteem, the belief that we have earned our wealth and power 
assuages guilt as we confront, in our daily lives, many people who 
are substantially less well off. How, then, do we support the belief 
that we deserve our prosperity? 
The argument that professionals deserve higher compensation 
than unskilled workers often emphasizes long years of expensive 
education, accompanied by foregone income during that period.230 
As a group, however, authors tend to have educational back-
grounds more akin to lawyers and architects than to cashiers and 
maintenance workers. If authors do not deserve incomes commen-
surate with their educational backgrounds, then how can other pro-
fessionals justify high compensation based on their educational 
attainments? Similarly, if one believes that those blessed with 
greater intelligence deserve greater financial reward - a difficult 
moral claim to sustain231 - authors as a group would appear to be 
228. See HAYEK, supra note 182, at 74. 
229. Within Protestantism, this attitude has religious origins, as individuals seek profes-
sional success for reassurance that they are among the chosen rather than the damned. See 
generally MAx WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND nm SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 109-13 
(Talcott Parsons trans., 1958). 
230. Indeed, some of the public grumbling about the salaries awarded to professional 
athletes appears to reflect the view that athletes do not deserve high salaries because, as a 
group, they do not have the education or intellectual abilities generally associated with high 
compensation occupations. But see HAYEK, supra note 182. 
I have never known ordinary people grudge the very high earnings of the boxer or to-
rero, the football idol or the cinema star or the jazz king - they seem often even to 
revel vicariously in the display of extreme luxury and waste of such figures compared 
with which those of industrial magnates or financial tycoons pale. 
Id. at 77. 
231. See supra text accompanying notes 176-90. 
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at least as deseiVing as other members of the professional and man-
agerial class. 
Extensive copyright protection, then, is quite consistent with the 
popular notion that the market system rewards the deserving. If 
copyright protection is necessary to ensure financial rewards for au-
thors, and if authors, by virtue of their education and innate abili-
ties, resemble other people who reap generous financial rewards, 
then authors must deserve copyright protection. 
Although only participants in the creative industries have a di-
rect financial stake in expanded copyright protection, a much 
broader and more influential group has reason to support legal 
rules that reinforce the premise that rewards in a market system 
mirror intelligence, education, and effort. Not only does such a 
premise increase self-esteem among the wealthy and powerful; it 
also increases public acceptance of disparities in wealth and 
power.232 Copyright lawyers understandably have seized upon 
rhetoric emphasizing the talents and efforts of authors; that rhetoric 
has been successful not only in the legislative process but in court as 
well. 
But the notion that market rewards are deserved - and, conse-
quently, that authors deserve compensation commensurate with 
their talents - rests on a faulty foundation. In a market economy, 
the principal importance of high compensation is as a signal 
designed to affect future behavior, not as a reward for past achieve-
ment.233 Lawyers do not deserve high incomes as a reward for their 
many years of training; instead, high incomes - reflecting the value 
clients attach to legal advice - serve to induce able people to in-
vest years of their life in legal training. Changes in market demand 
for legal services - like those that accompanied the recession in 
the early 1990s - may alter significantly lawyer compensation. 
Lawyers graduating before and after the decline in market demand 
invested the same time and energy in legal training; the disparity in 
compensation was not "deserved," but the drop in compensation 
232. See HAYEK, supra note 182, at 74. 
233. In Hayek's words, 
the importance for the functioning of the market order of particular prices or wages, and 
therefore of the incomes of the different groups and individuals, is not due chiefly to the 
effects of the prices on all of those who receive them, but to the effects of the prices on 
those for whom they act as signals to change the direction of their efforts. 
Id. at 71. 
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was important as a signal to recent college graduates deciding 
whether to pursue law as a career. Hayek put it well: 
The remunerations which the market determines are, as it were, not 
functionally related with what people have done, but only with what 
they ought to do. They are incentives which as a rule guide people to 
success, but will produce a viable order only because they often disap-
point the expectations they have caused when relevant circumstances 
have unexpectedly changed . . . . The element of luck is as insepara-
ble from the operation of the market as the element of skill.234 
Whatever its ultimate truth value, widespread acceptance of the 
proposition that market participants deserve their rewards may 
generate advantages for society- in particular, it may induce peo-
ple to work harder.235 Indeed, copyright protection in some form 
may be important as an incentive to creative activity. But it is as 
unrealistic to assume that any of the recent expansions in copyright 
protection will reinforce the general premise that financial rewards 
in our society are deserved as it is to assume that those same expan-
sions directly will induce more creative activity. Nevertheless, the 
rhetoric persists and, apparently, persuades. 
234. Id. at 116-17. 
235. See id. at 74. 
